



Havering

L O N D O N B O R O U G H

OVERVIEW & SCRUTINY BOARD AGENDA

7.30 pm

**Wednesday
7 December 2022**

**Havering Town Hall,
Main Road, Romford**

Members 12: Quorum 4

COUNCILLORS:

Conservative Group (4)

Timothy Ryan
Christine Smith
David Taylor
Damian White

Labour Group (2)

Mandy Anderson
Katharine Tumilty

Havering Residents' Group 5)

Laurance Garrard
Gerry O'Sullivan (Chairman)
Philip Ruck (Vice-Chair)
Natasha Summers
Bryan Vincent

East Havering Residents (1)

Martin Goode

For information about the meeting please contact:

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anthony.clements@oneSource.co.uk**

Under the Committee Procedure Rules within the Council's Constitution the Chairman of the meeting may exercise the powers conferred upon the Mayor in relation to the conduct of full Council meetings. As such, should any member of the public interrupt proceedings, the Chairman will warn the person concerned. If they continue to interrupt, the Chairman will order their removal from the meeting room and may adjourn the meeting while this takes place.

Excessive noise and talking should also be kept to a minimum whilst the meeting is in progress in order that the scheduled business may proceed as planned.

Protocol for members of the public wishing to report on meetings of the London Borough of Havering

Members of the public are entitled to report on meetings of Council, Committees and Cabinet, except in circumstances where the public have been excluded as permitted by law.

Reporting means:-

- filming, photographing or making an audio recording of the proceedings of the meeting;
- using any other means for enabling persons not present to see or hear proceedings at a meeting as it takes place or later; or
- reporting or providing commentary on proceedings at a meeting, orally or in writing, so that the report or commentary is available as the meeting takes place or later if the person is not present.

Anyone present at a meeting as it takes place is not permitted to carry out an oral commentary or report. This is to prevent the business of the meeting being disrupted.

Anyone attending a meeting is asked to advise Democratic Services staff on 01708 433076 that they wish to report on the meeting and how they wish to do so. This is to enable employees to guide anyone choosing to report on proceedings to an appropriate place from which to be able to report effectively.

Members of the public are asked to remain seated throughout the meeting as standing up and walking around could distract from the business in hand.

OVERVIEW AND SCRUTINY BOARD

Under the Localism Act 2011 (s. 9F) each local authority is required by law to establish an overview and scrutiny function to support and scrutinise the Council's executive arrangements.


The Overview and Scrutiny Board acts as a vehicle by which the effectiveness of scrutiny is monitored and where work undertaken by themed sub-committees can be coordinated to avoid duplication and to ensure that areas of priority are being reviewed. The Board also scrutinises general management matters relating to the Council and further details are given in the terms of reference below. The Overview and Scrutiny Board has oversight of performance information submitted to the Council's executive and also leads on scrutiny of the Council budget and associated information. All requisitions or 'call-ins' of executive decisions are dealt with by the Board.

The Board is politically balanced and includes among its membership the Chairmen of the six themed Overview and Scrutiny Sub-Committees.

Terms of Reference:

The areas scrutinised by the Board are:

- Strategy and commissioning
 - Partnerships with Business
 - Customer access
 - E-government and ICT
 - Finance (although each committee is responsible for budget processes that affect its area of oversight)
 - Human resources
 - Asset Management
 - Property resources
 - Facilities Management
 - Communications
 - Democratic Services
 - Social inclusion
 - Councillor Call for Action
-



AGENDA ITEMS

1 CHAIRMAN'S ANNOUNCEMENTS

The Chairman will announce details of the arrangements in case of fire or other events that might require the meeting room or building's evacuation.

2 APOLOGIES FOR ABSENCE AND ANNOUNCEMENT OF SUBSTITUTE MEMBERS

(if any) - receive.

3 DISCLOSURE OF INTERESTS

Members are invited to disclose any interest in any of the items on the agenda at this point of the meeting.

Members may still disclose any interest in an item at any time prior to the consideration of the matter.

4 MINUTES (Pages 1 - 10)

To approve as a correct record the minutes of the meeting of the Board held on 13 October 2022 and 10 November 2022 (attached) and to authorise the Chairman to sign them. Note: Exempt minutes of 10 November 2022 meeting not available to press or public.

5 EMERGENCY PLANNING AND RESILIENCE ASSURANCE (Pages 11 - 102)

Report attached.

Zena Smith
Democratic and Election Services Manager

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**MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE
OVERVIEW & SCRUTINY BOARD
Havering Town Hall, Main Road, Romford
13 October 2022 (7.30 - 10.30 pm)**

Present:

COUNCILLORS

Conservative Group	Christine Smith, Damian White, Ray Best, David Taylor and Michael White
Havering Residents' Group	Gerry O'Sullivan (Chairman), Philip Ruck (Vice-Chair) and Laurance Garrard
Labour Group East Havering Residents' Group	Mandy Anderson and Patricia Brown Martin Goode

Also present:
Councillor Michael White

Andrew Blake Herbert
Julie Oldale
Richard Tyler
Barbara Nicholls
Neil Stubbings
Kirsty Moller
Jeremy Welburn

9 CHAIRMAN'S ANNOUNCEMENTS

The Chairman advised those in the Chamber what to do in case of an emergency.

10 APOLOGIES FOR ABSENCE AND ANNOUNCEMENT OF SUBSTITUTE MEMBERS

Apologies were received from Councillors Tim Ryan (Ray Best substituting), Kathy Tumilty (Pat Brown substituting) and Natasha Summers. Councillor Michael White was also present.

11 DISCLOSURE OF INTERESTS

AGENDA ITEM 5. FINANCE UPDATE.
Councillor Mandy Anderson, Personal, Director of a company providing behavioural support services.

12 **MINUTES**

The minutes of the meetings of the Board held on 5 July 2022 were agreed as a correct record.

13 **FINANCE UPDATE**

Officers summarised the Council's current finances alongside a forecast of what the budget could look like given the current climate of high inflation. The Finance Update allowed scrutiny of the Council's financial position.

Discussion followed around the Council's resilience and its position over the next few years as government funding was unlikely to increase despite the growing strain on resources. According to the Census numbers, Havering had the second fastest growing child services need in the country.

The gaps in proposals, current year overspend, lobbying pressures with MPs, children asylum seekers, timescales for savings, internal monitoring etc. all posed a concern for the Council in future.

The Board **considered** the Cabinet report and appendices and **agreed** that any recommendations or further action from the Board would be emailed to the Chairman for circulation before the next briefing. Furthermore any comments or, if appropriate, alternative recommendations would be passed to the appropriate Cabinet Member.

14 **CORPORATE RISK REGISTER**

The Council's Corporate Risk Register was provided to the Board for review and was subject to regular review (at least quarterly) and risks were also discussed monthly, at Governance and Assurance Board meetings, chaired by the Section 151 officer. The Audit Committee also received an updated Corporate Risk Register every six months. As part of an ongoing review, new risks were added and existing risks amended or removed.

The Risk Management Strategy and Toolkit provided a comprehensive framework and process designed to support managers in ensuring that the Council was able to discharge its risk management responsibilities fully. The strategy outlined the objectives and benefits of managing risk, described the responsibilities for risk management, and provided an overview of the process that was in place to manage risk successfully.

It was to be noted that an emergency, natural disaster risk response report was being developed following the Wennington fires incident and emergency plans would be re-examined following the report. Wennington Fire Department had identified emergency response, ongoing recovery and

were discussing future triggers and further impact on residents (i.e. Christmas) as some residents were still not permanently homed.

Councillors recommended that they should be granted view only access to the Corporate Risk Register and the Directorate Risk Registers feeding into it.

15 **INCOME AND BUDGET PERFORMANCE FOR HAVERING'S JOINT VENTURES AND MERCURY LAND HOLDINGS**

The Board was presented with a report that aimed to answer the following questions: "What is the expected income and net profit from commercial and/or joint ventures organisations over the last 6 years for each year, together with the performance against budget." "Also, the predicted figures for the 2022/23 budget". The latter was split between what the Council had received in the first 5 months of this year and the target for the remainder of the year."

Exempt Appendices were contained within the report and therefore the public and the press were asked to exit the Chamber as is members of the public were present during these items there would be disclosure to them of exempt information within the meaning of paragraph 1 of Schedule 12A to the Local Government Act 1972.

The Board **received** a financial update around income and budget performance of the Joint Ventures and Mercury Land Holdings, and was asked to make comments and/or recommendations which could be emailed to the Chairman before the next meeting. It was further agreed that an additional meeting of the Board should be arranged in order to scrutinise this area further.

16 **RESILIENCE OF CARE HOME MARKET**

The Board was provided with a summary of the intelligence regarding the care home market, available capacity and mitigations to reduce the impact of provider failure.

It was explained that there were a range of sources of intelligence about provider sustainability. The Care Quality Commission (CQC) have a statutory duty to provide a Market Oversight role and therefore had an oversight of providers that had a large local or regional presence which, if they were to fail, could disrupt continuity of care in a local authority area. The CQC assessed the financial sustainability of adult social care providers that could be difficult to replace if they were to fail. CQC then provided advance notice to Local Authorities so they can put plans in place to ensure that people who are affected receive care.

Furthermore, there was a cost of living crisis evidenced by a cost of care exercise that would be submitted to Department of Health and Social Care.

The DHSC was at the assurance process stage before publishing within the public domain.

There were difficulties for care providers including: recruitment and retention of staff, issues around low pay (national living wage), financial difficulty with setting rates, and burnout and stress (especially following COVID 19).

It was also noted that different events affect social care provision differently at different times, thus far there was not a situation whereby Havering were concerned about their vulnerable residents not accessing a service they needed. Staff monitoring, assurance processes, agency staff reviews and reports would continue.

The Board **agreed** to note the contents of the report and any recommendations or suggestions for further action from the Board would be emailed to the Chairman for circulation before the next meeting.

Chairman

Public Document Pack

MINUTES OF A MEETING OF THE OVERVIEW & SCRUTINY BOARD Havering Town Hall, Main Road, Romford 10 November 2022 (7.30 - 9.19 pm)

Present:

COUNCILLORS

Conservative Group	Timothy Ryan
Havering Residents' Group	Laurance Garrard, Gerry O'Sullivan (Chairman) and Natasha Summers
Labour Group East Havering Residents' Group	Jane Keane and Katharine Tumilty Martin Goode

All decisions were taken with no votes against.

The Chairman reminded Members of the action to be taken in an emergency.

17 APOLOGIES FOR ABSENCE AND ANNOUNCEMENT OF SUBSTITUTE MEMBERS

Apologies were received from Councillors Christine Smith, David Taylor (Viddy Persaud substituting) Damian White, Philip Ruck (in attendance via videoconference) Natasha Summers and Mandy Anderson (Jane Keane substituting).

18 DISCLOSURE OF INTERESTS

There were no disclosures of interest.

19 EXCLUSION OF THE PUBLIC

It was agreed to exclude the public on the grounds that it was likely that there would be disclosure to them of exempt information within the meaning of paragraph 3 of Schedule 12A to the Local Government Act 1972.

20 INCOME AND BUDGET PERFORMANCE FOR HAVERING'S JOINT VENTURES AND MERCURY LAND HOLDINGS

Exempt item.

Chairman

By virtue of paragraph(s) 3 of Part 1 of Schedule 12A
of the Local Government Act 1972.

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OVERVIEW AND SCRUTINY BOARD

Subject Heading:	Emergency Planning and Resilience Assurance
SLT Lead:	Sandy Hamberger, Director of Policy, Strategy and Transformation
Report Author and contact details:	Jerry Haley, 01708 434370, jerry.haley@havering.gov.uk
Policy context:	This work falls under the council's new resources stream of work. Corporate and Community resilience is an enabler and supports the delivery of People and Place Priorities and activities that have been set out in the new Vision and Corporate Plan.
Financial summary:	There are no financial implications related to this decision

The subject matter of this report deals with the following Council Objectives

People: What matters to our residents	[X]
Places: What's important for our Borough	[x]
Resources: A well run council that delivers for People & Place	[x]

SUMMARY

Purpose of this Report

This report provides an introduction to, and overview of the Council's Emergency Planning arrangements, and a "self-assessment" of the council's current activity in relation to emergency preparedness and resilience against the London Resilience Standards which is the "benchmark" standard for all London Boroughs. The report enables the Overview & Scrutiny Board to scrutinise and identify any recommendations that they may wish to make to Cabinet, or other key lines of enquiry they may wish to undertake or ask the People or Places Sub-Committees to consider on their behalf.

Whilst it is recognised that officers have a professional responsibility in all designated and prevention activities, elected members have a vitally important Community Leadership role. This dynamic is an important balance to be achieved, to ensure the best outcomes are realised in each incident.

The London Borough of Havering is committed to the resilience of the council and that of the borough, and in the outcomes, we are delivering to improve the lives of our residents.

We have clear political and managerial leadership to deliver to a high standard against the London Resilience Standards. We work actively across London and in the northeast of London to support our own organisation in being prepared, able to respond to and recover from incidents. We have a 'can do' attitude in Havering and work together, both internally within the Council and with our Category One Responders such as the Police and Fire Service when needed by our residents.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The report is for discussion and review by the Overview and Scrutiny Board.

The Board is asked to identify any themes for further enquiry or recommendations it wishes to make to the Cabinet.

REPORT DETAIL

This report is divided into four sections:

Section One - Introduction and the statutory requirements placed upon Havering
Section Two – The London and National Context and how this aligns with Havering's Plans

Section Three - An update of the current emergency preparedness and resilience against the London Resilience Standards.

Section Four - Conclusion

Section One - Introduction and the statutory requirements placed upon Havering

1.1 This report provides an overview of the requirements and arrangements in place and acts as a precursor to the Havering self-assessment in relation to the Resilience Standards for London (RSL) as part of the wider Assurance Framework for London Local Government which needs to be delivered by the end of December. This assessment provides assurance both in regards to the Council's Emergency Planning function and the collaboration with other statutory Category responders and partners.

Context

Statutory Requirements

1.2 Under the Civil Authorities Contingency Act 2004 the Council is defined as a "Category One Responder", and is required to have emergency and business continuity plans and cooperate with other Category 1 Responders in our resilience area (London) in regards to Emergencies.

According to the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, Category 1 Responders shall:

- Maintain plans for the purpose of ensuring, so far as is reasonably practicable, that if an emergency occurs the person or body is able to continue to perform his or its functions
- Maintain plans for the purpose of ensuring that if an emergency occurs or is likely to occur the person or body is able to perform his or its functions so far as necessary or desirable for the purpose of:
 - preventing the emergency,
 - reducing, controlling or mitigating its effects, or
 - taking other action in connection with it.

1.3 This means in practice that there is a statutory duty for the Council to have an emergency plan to prevent and / or respond to emergencies in the community, and business continuity arrangements to maintain the delivery of its functions, whilst responding to the emergency.

Definition of an Emergency

1.4 The Civil Contingencies Act defines this as: *'An event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the UK, the environment of a place in the UK, or war or terrorism which threatens serious damage to the security of the UK'.*

1.5 The threat to human welfare is an emergency only if it involves, causes or may cause:

- Loss of human life,
- Human illness or injury,
- Homelessness,
- Damage to property,
- Disruption of a supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel,
- Disruption of a system of communication,
- Disruption of facilities for transport, or
- Disruption of services relating to health.”

Definition of a Major Incident

1.6 The Emergency Services continue to use the expression, ‘Major Incident’, which is defined as: ‘An event or situation with a range of serious consequences which requires special arrangements to be implemented by one or more emergency responder agency’.

Emergency Plan Command & Control structures in relation to the Emergency Plan:

1.7 The command and control structure of the Council in response is succinctly identified as:

- Gold (Strategic)
- Silver (Tactical)
- Bronze (Operational)

The Aim & Objectives of the Emergency Plan is:

1.8 To define the command, control, coordination and communication arrangements of the Council in the event of an emergency response in Havering. The objectives of the Emergency Plan are:

- To define the Council’s responsibilities in an emergency in accordance with the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and other relevant legislation and guidance.
- To detail the response roles of key Council responders.
- To define the mechanism for activating the Emergency Plan and the response arrangements.
- To outline the command and control arrangements that will be adopted by the Council for an emergency response.
- To describe how the Council’s emergency response and recovery processes will be activated.
- To provide a source of information and reference to those with key roles in the emergency response of the Council.

1.9 Role of the Local Authority in an Emergency and the purpose of the Council's emergency response is: '

- To provide an effective and coordinated Council response to an emergency affecting the community, in support of the combined multi-agency response, in order to manage the immediate effects of the emergency, mitigate the impact of the emergency – especially on the vulnerable - and hasten the return to normality through the recovery process.

1.10 The role of a local authority during an emergency may be summarised as:

1.11 Supporting the emergency services and other organisations involved in the immediate response, including:

- Assistance in the evacuation of the local community.
- Provision of premises for reception centres.
- Clearance of debris and restoration of roadways, provision of engineering services and emergency signing.
- Structural advice, and making safe or demolition of dangerous structures.
- Provision of a Temporary Mortuary.
- Communicating with the Public.

Humanitarian Assistance

1.12 Providing support services for the community and others affected by the incident. This could include:

- Provision of Emergency Rest Centres, with food and beverages, beds, and welfare services.
- Provision of a physical Humanitarian Assistance Centre for the dissemination of information and support to those affected by the emergency.
- Provision of emergency sanitation and hygiene services.
- Re-housing of those made homeless, in both the short and long term. Inspection of housing.
- Environmental health management.
- Implementation of measures to control the spread of disease.
- Clearance and mitigation of pollution incidents.
- Enabling the community to recover and return to normality as soon as possible.

Section Two – The London and National Context and how this aligns with Havering's Plans

The London Context

2.1 On behalf of the Mayor of London, Greater London Authority, Local Authorities and London Fire Brigade, "The London Resilience Forum " coordinates institutions and communities to prevent, handle, recover and learn from disruption, and adapt to change; to ensure London survives and prospers.

2.2 The “London Resilience Forum” (LRF), ensures London's preparedness in the event of emergencies and coordinates the activities of a wide range of organisations to achieve this. It also provides a link between emergency preparedness and resilience at the local and national levels, of which Havering is part of.

2.3 More than 170 organisations make up the London Resilience Partnership. To make sure the views of all organisations can be effectively represented at the London Resilience Forum, work is conducted by a series of specific groups and sector panels which report into the main forum.

2.4 As well as the London Resilience Forum, each local authority area maintains a Borough Resilience Forum. These local arrangements enable local cooperation and information sharing.

2.5 In 2018/19, the LRF adopted a set of eleven resilience standards designed to lead to good outcomes and leading practice whilst supporting compliance with the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. The content within each standard has been drawn from national government guidance and legislation, LGA guidance, London specific guidance and other publications and reports; examples include relevant British Standards and the Kerslake report (Manchester Arena Incident Review).

2.6 All London Councils are required to provide a “position statement” also known as a self-assessment against these by the end of December 2022. This report has used that framework as the basis of providing a current “Position Statement” as that will be the standard to be achieved and assurance of the Councils Response and Planning.

National Covid-19 Public Inquiry underway

2.7 The UK Covid-19 Inquiry has been set up to examine the UK's response to and impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, and learn lessons for the future.

2.8 The Inquiry is chaired by Baroness Heather Hallett, a former Court of Appeal judge. The Inquiry has been established under the Inquiries Act (2005). This means that the Chair will have the power to compel the production of documents and call witnesses to give evidence on oath.

2.9 The Chair was appointed in December 2021. Following a public consultation, the Chair wrote to the Prime Minister to recommend changes to the draft Terms of Reference. The final Terms of Reference were received in June 2022.

2.10 As part of phase one all London Councils were required in November 2022 to complete an online survey regarding their Emergency Planning prepared for that. It is unclear which Council/s may be called as “witnesses” as part of that process. Havering Councils survey responses are in-line with our arrangements as set out in this report.

Arrangements within Havering Council

2.11 Currently the guidance and co-ordinating responsibility lies within the Communities Team under the Head of Communities. The major emergency plan is reviewed in light of the London resilience Forum guidance and are available for the public on the internet via the following link

[https://www.havering.gov.uk/downloads/file/2841/what we do in an emergency - havering major emergency plan](https://www.havering.gov.uk/downloads/file/2841/what_we_do_in_an_emergency_-_havering_major_emergency_plan)

2.12 The Team is made up of three officers that have undertaken the recommended training by the Cabinet Officer, Emergency Planning College at Easingwold, Yorkshire. This course is an in-depth introduction to emergency planning, business continuity, risk management, community resilience etc. The post of the Corporate and Community Resilience Manager, remains vacant awaiting realignment under the Target Operating Model Review, after the substantive post-holder left in October. The post will be filled as a matter of urgency once realignment takes place under the TOM.

2.13 The Emergency Planning team are the first point of contact through the Local Authority Liaison Officer (LALO) when an incident is notified to us out of office hours should the emergency services require assistance. The Havering Emergency Planning Officer call out list ensures that there is an availability to respond to major emergency calls from the emergency services 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.

2.14 A Havering Emergency Planning Officer will activate and co-ordinate an appropriate council-wide response to major incidents. This could include engaging others to set up rest centres and cordoning off roads.

2.15 The Emergency Planning Team liaise with the LALO on call and other category one responders and command structure and services and undertake a post incident debrief, that feeds back into the Plan, review and redo approach.

2.16 The table below sets out the number and nature of incidents the EP team has been involved in over the past five years

Date	Type of Incident	Address (if a/v)	Area
04/03/2018	Explosion	Farnham Road Post Office	Romford
17/04/2018	Chemical spill	Olive AP Academy (formerly Robert Beards Youth Centre)	Hornchurch
29/04/2018	Fire - Bin chute	Dryden Towers	Harold Hill
05/05/2018	Email threats	Hacton, Squirrels Heath & Elm Park Schools	Borough-wide
09/09/2018	Fire	Brook Lodge, Medora Road	Romford

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06/02/2019	Operation Scotney		Harold Hill
06/07/2019	Fire	Launder's Lane	Rainham
27/07/2019	Fire	Rosewood Avenue, Elm Park	Hornchurch
08/08/2019	Fire	Goldfinch House, Raven Close	Romford
22/01/2020	COVID-19		Borough-wide
15/08/2020	Flood	Lambs Lane North, Brookway and various addresses	Rainham
16/08/2020	Fire	Uphavering House, Parkhill Close, Hornchurch	Hornchurch
02/10/2020	Flood	Abbs Cross Lane	Hornchurch
14/01/2021	Flood		Borough-wide
24/03/2021	Leak	Braeburn House, Orchard Village	Rainham
25/06/2021	Flood		Borough-wide
18/02/2022	Storm		Borough-wide
19/07/2022	Fire	Drapers Court, Mavis Grove	Hornchurch
19/07/2022	Fire	Wennington	Rainham
10/08/2022	Fire	Queens Moat House, St Edwards Way	Romford
08/11/2022	Fire	6 St Edwards Way	Romford

2.17 As can be seen by the table, the severity of the incidents has increased this year with the Wennington Fires being classed as a major incident.

2.18 In-line with the statutory and LRF, the Councils has the following key plans:

Theme	Emergency Preparedness through capability development				
Individual Work streams	Outcome	Deliverables	Milestone	Responsibility	Status
HBRF capability and plan development	LBH to provide the lead agency role of developing capabilities/plans as per the London Partnership Work plan – updated every 3 years unless specified or significant changes required.	Mass Evacuation	2021-23	LBH Corporate and Community Resilience Team (CCRT)	Completed January 21
		Mass Shelter (combined with Shelter)	2021-23		Completed January 21
		Excess Deaths	2021-23		Completed Feb 21
		Major Emergency Plan (<i>updated yearly</i>)	2022		Completed Sept 22
		Recovery Management Plan	2021-23		Completed February 21
		Corporate Business	2022-23		Due February 23 -

		Continuity Plan (updated yearly)			
		Humanitarian Assistance Plan including Rest Centre	2022-23		Updated Rest Centre Plan due December 2022. HA plan due December 2023
		Flogas COMAH Plan (LRG Responsibility)	Overdue		LRG completing this and should be signed off by end of 2022
		Structural collapse, response and recovery	2021-23		Completed July 2021
		Mass Fatalities/DDM	2022-23		DDM Plan with stakeholders for sign off by the end of 2022
		Multi-agency Flood Plan	2022-23		Due 2025 – but update after Flood exercise in March 2023
		Outbreak of a notifiable animal disease	2022-23		Completed Dec 21
		Pandemic Influenza Plan	2022-23		Ongoing work to include Pandemic learning.
		Water Supply Disruption Plan	2021-22		Due 2022

Risk Management Focus

2.19 The Councils Corporate Risk Register carefully considers this key duty and includes a risk that considers and mitigates the probability and impact of “Major system, supplier, external infrastructure failure or natural disaster” (HAV006). Majority of the mitigations relate to the plans held by the Emergency Planning team, including the:

- Major emergency plan in place within organisation to mitigate the initial impacts of these types of events.
- Corporate Business Continuity Plan and individual service area Business Continuity Plans held and updated by services.
- Corporate Business Continuity Plan outlines critical service for initial priorities with included service time scales.
- Individual incident plans for specific scenario for example, Multi-agency flood plan, Excess Deaths Plan, Severe Weather, etc.
- Regular updates of plans and testing and exercising associated risks

2.20 Additionally, there is a Cyber, Information Governance and Technology Risk (HAV002), that considers and mitigates the impact of a criminal act, experienced

most recently by Hackney Council. Which would see the Emergency and BCP activated.

2.21 A key mitigation in all Emergencies is effective Business Continuity Planning and regular exercise/simulations that provide a continuous plan, review and redo approach.

Planned Exercises externally and within the council

1. "Power-cuts" – this will be undertaken in line with LRF guidelines imminently
2. "Flooding preparedness" will be undertaken in March 2023.
3. Business Continuity Plans will be refreshed in February 2023

Preparation for those

2.22 SLT and CLT Leadership took part in a Cyber Attack case-study session on 22 November 2022, based on the recent lessons learnt from the London Borough of Hackney. This was prioritised as it directly impacts on loss of data and access to systems, which are issues that arise from current live issues (Power cuts and Cyber Attacks).

2.23 Services will use this learning to undertake their annual review of their BCPs in February to ensure they remain current ahead of that. See 3.48 for a full list of exercises.

Organisational assurance and scrutiny undertaken

2.24 Every major incident has a "hot-debrief" following an incident and a full de-brief a few weeks later that informs our planning and approach.

2.25 Following the activation of the Council's Emergency Response arrangements for covid-19 in March 2020. In October 2020, the Overview & Scrutiny Board established a Topic Group to review the impact of the COVID pandemic and the Council's emergency planning response to it.

The Scope of the Scrutiny Topic Group review:

2.26 The focus was on the Council's emergency planning arrangements and the operation of its Command Structure. It therefore concentrated on the following key areas:

1. Review the Council's influenza-pandemic plan and develop an understanding of the Council's Command structure. Challenge and review planning assumptions contained within the plan (was the response proportionate to the risk);
2. Understand and explore the relationship between the Command structure and the Borough Resilience Forum; a. With reference to the Community Resilience Development Framework, was there sufficient support for individuals identified at

being of greatest risk? How are we doing it and what worked well/not so well (lessons learnt) b. Promotion of the pandemic plans/Command responses into Member organisations from the business and voluntary sector. How was it communicated and were there any areas for improvement? c. Was the Resilience Plan tested pre-Covid? If so, what were the improvements gleaned from it?

3. Communication roles between Command, the Resilience Forum and elected Members. How the council communicated government guidance on responding to the pandemic and impacts on service provision.

2.27 Scrutiny Findings

- The rapid transition into an emergency planning situation and the mobilisation of the associated pandemic plans and Command Structure demonstrated to the Topic Group that emergency planning was firmly embedded practice in the Council.
- Testing of emergency plans is undertaken as a routine practice. The current emergency plans were tested in April 2019. This reinforces the above statement that emergency planning arrangements are well established amongst the officer cohort.
- The scale and longevity of the pandemic has exceeded all previous pandemic planning scenarios. For example, lockdown restrictions had not previously featured in any pandemic planning. Emergency plans have therefore been modified throughout key stages of the pandemic, however the core of the Command Structure and the governance framework which supports it has remained intact and effective.

Section Three - An update of the current emergency preparedness and resilience against the LRF Standards.

3.1 This section gives Members an overview of the proposed Resilience Standards for London local government and our self-assessed position statement against them.

The Resilience Standards for London

3.2 The Resilience Standards for London (RSL) were launched in 2019. These are the independent way in which the organisation is assessed for resilience and preparedness around Emergency Planning. This comprises of eleven standards that are designed to both provide assurance and also to drive continuous improvement across the full range of this area of work: from senior leadership and organisational culture to emergency response to recovery and building community resilience.

3.3 Each standard is comprised of a desired outcome which is complemented by a summary of legal duties, good practice guidance and links to supporting documentation.

3.4 There is no requirement to submit an assessment against all standards but rather each borough will need to produce a position statement highlighting strengths as well as areas identified for improvement.

3.5 Resilience Standards and position statement

Standard 1 Risk Assessment

3.6 Desired Outcome: The council has a robust and collectively understood assessment of the most significant risks to the local area, based on how likely they are to happen and what their impacts might be. This information is used to inform a range of risk management decisions, including the development of proportionate emergency plans and preparations.

3.7 Position Statement: Havering has a robust understanding of the risks associated to the council and its local area. The Council has a comprehensive internal corporate risk management process, including a Corporate Risk Register containing the risks to the Council along with mitigation and controls. The Corporate Risk Register with specific risks as threats being managed by the Council's Corporate and Community Resilience Team. This risk register is updated regularly and discussed quarterly with the Director of Strategy, Policy and Transformation.

3.8 The Havering Borough Resilience Forum (HBRF) oversees the Havering Borough Risk Register, which is available publicly online, and is updated subject to regular review by the HBRF Risk Assessment Working Group (RAWG) and are localised based on the ongoing National Risk Assessment and the London Risk Advisory Group (LRAG) process along with incorporating lessons identified following emergency events we have had in the Borough such as flooding and the Wennington Fire in July this year.

3.9 Both these risk management approaches take on a planning assumption approach to identify potential consequences to suit the dynamic modern urban risk environment in London.

3.10 Areas of Focus and Improvement:

- Update the Borough Risk Register to make a more publicly facing document in order to communicate risk
- Widen the Havering Borough Resilience Forum to additional Council representatives (e.g. subject matter experts).

Standard 2 Governance Arrangements – Political Leadership

3.11 Desired Outcome: A council that operates with effective political governance which enables the organisation to meet their duties under the Civil Contingencies Act, and to achieve local resilience objectives.

3.12 Position Statement: An 'away day' took place in July 2022 to brief the new Cabinet on Emergency Planning and Resilience. They were briefed on a fictional emergency involving flooding with the Leader taking the role of the LALO.

3.13 Havering Council has a well-established scrutiny function, which has facilitated Elected Members to challenge Contingency Planning arrangements. Overview and Scrutiny Committee meetings have reviewed past incidents that have affected London and Havering alongside the Councils level of preparedness and response. This has included the ongoing issues regarding Launderers Lane.

3.14 Areas of Improvement:

- Members to be offered a greater range of training on Emergency Planning and Resilience matters once the proposed Target Operating Model is in place.
- The principles of a 'Councillor's Guide to Civil Emergencies' as produced by the Local Government Association to be embedded in our future training and development programme for Members. Consultation with Members will take place on the best way to embed this. This is contained as Appendix A

Standard 3 Managerial Leadership

3.15 Desired Outcome: A council that operates with managerial leadership that drives the emergency planning and resilience agenda across the organisation. The organisation meets their duties under the Civil Contingencies Act and achieves local resilience objectives.

3.16 Position Statement: The Corporate and Community Resilience Team (CCRT) coordinates all resilience activities across the Council, including duties under the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) for Emergency Preparedness, Response and Recovery (EPRR), Business Continuity Management (BCM), Organisational Resilience and other supportive functions across the Council. The CCRT actively supports other teams working in collaboration with them to share expertise in order to deliver a shared goal; a more resilient Borough for the community.

3.17 Resilience and contingency planning matters are regularly discussed on the Senior Leadership Team (SLT) Agenda. The council has clear pathway and channel to escalate and disseminate alert and risk critical information.

3.18 Areas for Improvement

- Greater involvement of the Corporate Leadership team in the corporate and community resilience agenda. Training is needed for this to ensure mainstreaming of the agenda further.
- Encourage service leads (Assistance Director or Head of Service) to undertake training such as the role of Rest Centre Manager to strengthen the pool of competent leader to take charge during an emergency.

Standard 4 Culture – Organisational Engagement

3.19 Desired Outcome: The council has a positive culture towards Emergency Planning and resilience which is embedded and seen as everyone's business. Capacity and resilience are developed across the organisation ensuring the responsibility of plans and decision making is at the appropriate level, building experience and knowledge across the organisation.

3.20 Position Statement: The CCRT has established clear partnership and arrangements with all service areas during an emergency response, including out-of-hours and on-call teams. The CCRT works closely with the Council Communications team to ensure time-critical information in a disaster is shared internally and externally. The Council has strengthened its team of Local Authority Liaison Officers (LALO) in 2022 to a total of 9 officers and continued to develop staff capable of taking up the role of LALO.

3.21 There is engagement in training exercises including those run by London Resilience Group and local interventions. The local interventions have included terrorist attacks and flooding in recent years although 'live' interventions have been curtailed in recent years. An exercise concentrating on flooding is currently being planned for 2023.

3.22 Areas for improvement:

- Develop an Organisational Resilience Strategy, aligning to ISO 65000
- Further ongoing consultation and collaboration with staff and partners around resilience
- Develop with partners a full range of exercises post covid-19

Standard 5 Organisational Plans and Procedures

3.23 Desired Outcome: The council has risk-based emergency plans which are easy to use, clearly understood, and exercised set of arrangements to reduce, control or mitigate the effect of emergencies in both the response and recovery phases.

3.24 Position Statement: The London Borough of Havering has a range of contingency plans in the form of generic, specific and multi-agency plans. The overarching plan is the Havering Major Emergency Plan which is updated regularly and subject to approval via the Senior Leadership Team through the Executive Decision process.

3.25 The Havering Major Emergency Plan forms a strategic document, owned by top management in order to provide a flexible and robust emergency management framework under which the Council, working closely with resilience partners, can provide an effective and efficient response to major emergencies in Havering, and in support of other London Boroughs when requested. This document, and the response structures featured form the necessary capacity in order to respond to any event or situation that occurs or threatens to affect the organisation or community.

3.26 This includes clear activation and notification systems along with robust command, control and coordination structures.

3.27 Beneath the Havering Major Emergency Plan exists a range of specific contingency plans driven by risk assessment and planning assumption requirements based on regional and national guidance, standards and supporting information such as lessons capture and good practice. These specific contingency plans are designed to deal with a range of emergencies and include all top identified risks such as flooding.

3.28 After each emergency there is a strategic debrief and lessons identified against processes contained within the Havering Major Emergency Plan, and formal debrief meetings are held with subsequent reports/actions/recommendations are shared across the partnership following any significant incident.

3.29 To underpin all the Emergency Preparedness, Response and Recovery capabilities, Havering has a comprehensive Business Continuity Management programme to ensure that the organisation can effectively adapt and react to business disruption in order to react to stresses that are placed on the Borough. For example, there is a specific piece of work taking place now by the Transformation Team to enhance cyber security. Business Continuity Plans are updated in February each year as part of an annual cycle.

3.30 Areas for Improvement:

- Ensure that learning from major incidents is constantly taken on board as quickly as possible and transferred to other situations as they occur

Standard 6 Resources, Roles and Responsibilities

3.31 **Desired Outcome:** The council has sufficient resources in place to support emergency planning and organisational resilience arrangements and has the ability to scale up staff resources, not only to support the response and recovery, but also to maintain the delivery of business-critical services.

3.32 **Position Statement:** The Council's priority is to ensure that our residents, businesses and community are supported in an emergency and the appropriate resources are made immediately available and remain scalable and sustainable for as long as required.

3.33 The Council's role and responsibility is clearly defined and explained in the Havering Major Emergency Plan (MEP) and accompanying Emergency Planning Policy. Within the MEP are the relevant Command, Control and Communication (C3) chapters that illustrates the structures around how as an organisation we stand up and respond to an emergency, aligned to London Local Authority Standardisation.

3.34 We have a clearly defined 'Council Gold' strategic role and accompanying rota system in place and all members of the Council Senior Leadership Team (SLT) are experienced in being on call during emergencies. Alongside we have the Local Authority Liaison Officer (LALO) and 'Second' On-Call Emergency Planning Officer to undertake the 'Council Silver' tactical response, both 24/7/365. There are other operational council teams who support this, for example Corporate Communications team who can effectively communicate, respond and form statements for the public, media and social media during and after an emergency.

3.35 Robust arrangements are in place for the Leader of the Council, Cabinet Members and Ward Councillors to be notified of an incident affecting Havering, as appropriate 24/7/365. Cabinet Members have undergone a recent training pilot in order to illustrate their role and the role of the Council in an emergency.

3.36 Havering has a fit for purpose Borough Emergency Control Centre (BECC) dedicated to forming the nerve centre of the response during an emergency. This is located in TR1 of the Town Hall and houses all the equipment required under the Resilience Standards for London. The facility and its equipment are regularly tested and exercised via scheduled maintenance, command-post exercises, training events and real incidents. Since COVID-19, staff are also trained to set up a BECC and Rest Centre virtually.

3.37 Recent training events, exercises and incidents have successfully tested these arrangements. Whilst we do have trained and experienced staff, issues such as volunteer recruitment, retention and remuneration do exist.

3.38 Areas of Focus and Improvement

- In order to meet the designated Resilience Standards for London of 48-hour response capability without support from other Boroughs, more resource is needed as we battle against the effect of climate change. This year has seen more emergency incidents than most previous years.

Standard 7 Partnerships

3.39 **Desired Outcome:** The council demonstrates a high level of partnership working and interoperability between itself and all emergency responder and supporting organisations, as a means to ensure an inclusive, collaborative approach to Integrated Emergency Management.

3.40 **Position Statement:** The London Borough of Havering chair and provide the secretariat function for the Havering Borough Resilience Forum (HBRF), facilitating a meeting on at least a biannually basis. The meeting is open to all Category 1 and 2 Responders along with other supporting partners forming a group of local and regional representatives that can actively discuss, make decisions and engage in strategic discussions about local resilience matters. Attendance is pleasingly high from a multitude of partners.

3.41 The HBRF is the custodian of the Havering Borough Risk Register, this document along with the risks contained are subject to regular review by the HBRF Risk Assessment Working Group (RAWG) and are localised based on the ongoing National Risk Assessment and the London Risk Advisory Group (LRAG) process along with incorporating lessons identified following emergency events.

3.42 Future resilience challenges affecting the Borough are often discussed at various fora, meetings and engagement events that include representation from resilience partners and Havering Council and often include discussion items such as sustainability, flood risk management, climate change and extreme weather.

3.43 The Council chair the CONTEST Board and also oversees the multi-agency event Safety Advisory Group (SAG) which regularly meets to discuss the safe delivery of local events in the Borough and has a wide council service and multi-agency representation.

3.44 Areas of Focus and Improvement:

- Review the governance and reporting lines of the Havering Borough Resilience Forum locally
- Enhance HBRF multi-agency training and exercising programme with greater input from partners
- Continually enhance partnership working practices across the organisation ensuring that resilience matters are a priority and regularly discussed, such as with the business and voluntary sector

Standard 8 Training, Exercise and Evaluation

3.45 **Desired Outcome:** Members and officers across the organisation are competent to fulfil their roles in emergency preparedness, response and recovery. The council develops and assures their resilience capabilities and arrangements through an exercise programme that is risk-based. Lessons learned from previous exercises and incidents have been identified and plans modified accordingly.

3.46 **Position Statement:** A comprehensive training and exercising programme in Havering is in place, and ever evolving to accommodate new standards, guidance, best practice and initiatives. The current training programme is still developing to encompass new roles as part of the Local Authority Standardisation being rolled out across London.

3.47 In addition, new training and exercising initiatives are underway in Havering to ensure that all Emergency response roles are given suitable access to training on a regular basis to ensure sufficient people are trained and competent in their roles (e.g. Rest Centre Manager and LALOs). It is acknowledged there are always some training gaps and both the availability and frequency of training and exercising offered can be always be improved upon and will be reviewed and addressed once the new Council structure is in place. The Corporate and Community Resilience team plans on working towards delivering a more structured less reactive annual

training and exercising plan, that will in the future incorporate lessons from recent major incidents.

3.48 The list below gives a synopsis of what exercises have taken place over the last five years and what partners were involved.

- Exercise Connects 2017, Communications drill: LRG, NE boroughs
- Exercise Safer City 2017, Table-top Severe Weather drill
- Exercise Atlantis 2017 Table-top Flood drill: MPS, LFB, NELFT, EA, Met Office, Red Cross
- Exercise Connects 2018, Communications drill: LRG, NE boroughs
- Exercise Safer City 2018, Table-top Counter Terrorism drill
- Exercise Exodus 2018, Table-top Terrorist attack drill: MPS, LFB, NELFT, LAS, BHRUT, NHSE, E&S Water, Salvation Army
- Exercise Safehouse 2018, Live Marauding Terrorist Attack drill: MPS, LAS, Romford Night Time Economy
- Exercise Contagion 2019, Table-top Influenza Pandemic drill: MPS, LFB, NELFT, PHE, BHRUT, Red Cross
- Exercise Safer City 2019, Table-top Water disruption drill
- Exercise Matattack 2020, Live Marauding Terrorist Attack drill: MPS
- Cross Border Outbreak 2020, COVID-19 drill: NE boroughs
- Exercise Cybattack 2021, Table-top Cyber attack drill
- Exercise Connects 2021, Communications drill: LRG, NE boroughs
- Exercise Connects 2022, Communications drill: LRG, NE boroughs

3.49 Havering has a comprehensive evaluation process leading to post exercise reports, and similarly operational incidents are debriefed in a timely manner, where lessons learnt and recommendations are being actioned.

3.50 It should be remembered that when real incidents such as flooding and fires caused by heatwaves take place, there is less need for exercising as the Council and partners need to deal with real life emergency situations.

3.51 Areas of Focus and Improvement:

- Deliver an updated more structured annual Training and Exercising programme to include all response roles
- Continue to explore joint training and exercising opportunities with other East London Boroughs
- Arrange Elected Member Training opportunities

Standard 9 Business Continuity

3.52 **Desired Outcome:** The council is able to demonstrate a high level of resilience in their priority functions and emergency response and recovery capabilities.

3.53 **Position Statement:** Havering has an established and robust Business Continuity Management (BCM) programme in place and a policy that outlines the

requirement for Directors, Heads of Service and Team Leaders to have current BCM plans in place which are communicated and understood within their teams and tested with a scenario-based exercise. Corporately, the current BCM lifecycle allows all services to refresh their agreed BCM plans and procedures at least annually, or more often such as following learning from an exercise, incident or the release of any new guidance or requirement.

3.54 The Corporate Community and Resilience Team supports the organisation by coordinating the annual BCM programme, driven by the Director of Strategy, Policy and Transformation and approved by the Senior Leadership Team (SLT) and the Chief Executive.

3.55 The BCM programme outlines the process in which BCM is embedded across the organisation, agreed by top management through to Directorate summaries and Service level Business Continuity Planning. Overall, this approach to BCM is discussed at SLT every year and is collectively owned by them and the Corporate Leadership Team (CLT).

3.56 Areas of Focus and Improvement:

- More work needs to be done when a service is outsourced to ensure there is no service delivery gap if an emergency occurs
- Consider embedding Business Continuity into annual service planning

Standard 10 Community Resilience

3.57 **Desired Outcome:** The council has a strategic and coordinated approach to activity that enables individuals, businesses, community networks and voluntary organisations to behave in a resilient way and act to support other members of the public. Community resilience considerations and the voluntary capabilities of all these partners are integrated into existing emergency management plans.

3.58 **Position Statement:** Havering Council continues to promote and engage with annual campaigns that relate to community resilience, safety and awareness of risks in the Borough. These include winter readiness, heatwave advice etc.

3.59 The Community and Corporate Resilience Team have engaged with groups such as the Compact Forum that represents the Community and Voluntary Sector so they are aware of risks such as flooding.

3.60 The Havering Volunteer Centre continues to be a great support throughout recent events such as COVID-19 (arranging volunteers for test and vaccination centres) and Wennington fire (the setup of a centre for physical donations and its subsequent transfer to Romford).

3.61 Areas of Focus and Improvement:

- Develop a Havering Community Resilience Strategy
- Develop spontaneous volunteering and arrangements

- Further ongoing consultation and collaboration with voluntary, business and community networks
- Explore a database of community volunteers, resources and expertise available

Standard 11 Recovery Management

3.62 Desired Outcome: The council has robust, embedded and flexible recovery management arrangements in place to support the rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitation of the community following an emergency. Arrangements clearly link and complement emergency response arrangements, enable the smooth transition from response to recovery and support collective decision making to initiate, inform, resource, monitor and ultimately closedown the recovery phase of emergencies.

3.63 Position Statement: Havering Council has robust recovery management arrangements in place. This can be seen both with COVID-19 and the recent Wennington Fires with the smooth transition from response phase to recovery phase in each of these major incidents.

3.64 Havering has established recovery management plans in place that have been tested, exercised and used in several incidents over the years. The Havering Major Emergency Plan details the strategic recovery and restoration to 'relative' normality process and illustrates in detail how the longer-term activity of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the community is undertaken.

3.65 Built into all emergency and business continuity plans and procedures in Havering, recovery management is a process that initiates at the earliest possible stage during an incident and formally starts when the situation has been stabilised. All information and media management are undertaken by the Corporate Communications Team.

3.66 Areas of Focus and Improvement:

- Continue to incorporate lessons identified from historic incidents into the Recovery Strategy documents
- Develop and enhance stronger relationships with private, charity and community organisations
- Create a recovery checklist

Section Four - Conclusion

4.1 Going forward, the focus of the team is likely to be cost of living, climate change, power outages, flooding, winter storms, cold weather alerts and other seasonal pressures. Plans are already underway to address these.

4.2 These standards should be seen as part of a broader assurance framework for the council, with the aim of continually improving performance across its emergency planning and resilience activities.

4.3 It is anticipated that the increasing future need will require additional resources, which will be considered as part of the TOM work outlined in the Chief Executives report to Cabinet on the 9th November 2022.

4.4 This work has already started with an increase of number of Local Authority Liaison Officers (LALOs) being increased from seven to nine.

IMPLICATIONS AND RISKS

Financial implications and risks:

There are no financial implications associated with approving the Council's Emergency Planning & Resilience arrangements. However, the delivery and monitoring may have financial implications for the Council and its partners

Legal implications and risks:

The legislative framework is set out at Section 1 of this Report and therefore will not be repeated here.

There are no apparent legal implications in considering the Report and making any recommendations considered appropriate.

Human Resources implications and risks:

There are no human resource implications associated with this report, however ongoing training will be made available to those staff who require it.

Equalities implications and risks:

There are no equalities implications associated with this report

ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATE CHANGE IMPLICATIONS AND RISKS

There are environment and climate change implications associated with this report. Climate change is likely to have implications for the Council in terms of more storms, floods heatwaves and fires.

A robust emergency planning and business continuity strategy is therefore essential to combat these risks and ensure competent and appropriate response and recovery arrangements are in place.

Overview and Scrutiny Board, 7th December 2022

London Borough of Havering Corporate Risk Register October 2022 - included in papers

[Emergency planning and our responsibilities | Emergency planning | The London Borough Of Havering](#)

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/913502/NRS_for_LRFs_V3.0_Aug2020.pdf

[National resilience strategy call for evidence Local Government Association response - September 2021 | Local Government Association](#)

[London Resilience Forum | LGOV](#)

Havering's Cabinet 7/2/2021 [Topic Group report 2.pdf \(havering.gov.uk\)](#)

[Microsoft Word - Kerslake Arena Review PROOFED.docx \(jesip.org.uk\)](#)

A councillor's guide to civil emergencies

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Foreword

I am pleased to introduce this updated version of the Local Government Association (LGA) councillor's guide to civil emergencies. Although the original version of this document was only published in 2016, there was a clear need to update it given the importance of all of us understanding and learning from colleagues up and down the country who in 2017 faced the challenge of dealing with the most devastating emergencies we can imagine.

The attacks in Westminster, Manchester, London Bridge and Islington were a terrible illustration of the ongoing terrorism risk we must remain vigilant to, while the fire at Grenfell Tower highlighted the importance of councils visibly responding to and leading their communities following a disaster. The Novichok incidents in south Wiltshire in 2018 also highlight that, to say the least, some risks can be extremely difficult to predict.

What all of these incidents showed is how much our experience of emergencies has changed in recent years, even since the terrorist attacks of 2005. The widespread use of camera phones and social media, and advent of rolling news, not only enable the public and press to pretty much live stream emergencies and the response to them; they also facilitate the sharing of information – and sometimes misinformation – exceptionally quickly. In these circumstances, there is a clear need for councils to be fleet of foot in their responses. The risks of not doing so are significant; yet all of us know that this has become more difficult given the way that resources are more stretched following years of austerity.

The heightened visibility of emergencies also makes it important for councillors to fulfil their civic and community leadership roles equally visibly. The saying that trust arrives on foot but leaves on horseback resonates strongly in relation to our handling of emergencies.

The purpose of this document is to provide an overview of the role and responsibilities of councils, cabinet members, and ward councillors, in terms of ensuring preparedness and resilience, responding to, and recovering from emergencies. These roles are different, but complementary; all of them are critically important. Based on the experience of and feedback from colleagues who have dealt with emergencies most recently, we intentionally focus throughout on the themes of leadership and communication, and highlight some of the potential pitfalls to be mindful of.

I hope that you find the guide useful, and most importantly that you will use it as a prompt to think about and scrutinise your authority's, and your personal preparedness for responding to an emergency. Only by developing our understanding, and regularly reviewing our plans, can we ensure that we are as prepared as we can be for any of the emergencies we may need to deal with.

Councillor Simon Blackburn

Chair, LGA Safer and Stronger Communities Board

Core terms and components of the civil contingencies framework

Core terms and components of the civil contingencies framework

The legal framework for responding to emergencies sets out clear roles and responsibilities, and emergency planning work relies heavily on established doctrine and procedures which broadly apply across different types of emergency. Councillors should ensure they have a basic understanding of these so that they understand the council's role in an emergency, as well as their own personal role as councillors. The key terms and concepts are summarised below.

Civil Contingencies Act 2004	The Civil Contingencies Act (the Act) sets out the legislative framework for responding to civil emergencies.
Civil emergency	An event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare or the environment of a place in the UK, or war or terrorism which threatens serious damage to the security of the UK.
Rising tide emergency	An emergency for which there is some level of advance warning, for example a flood which could be predicted based on weather forecasts and river levels.
No notice emergency	An emergency which is instantaneous and for which there is no notice. Recent examples include the Shoreham Bypass air crash and Manchester Arena attack.
Category one responder (to a civil emergency)	Organisations which are likely to be at the core of the response to most emergencies and are therefore subject to the full range of civil protection duties in the Act. Councils, the emergency services, health services, and Environment Agency are category one responders.
Category two responder (to a civil emergency)	These are cooperating responders, who are less likely to be involved in the heart of multi-agency planning work, but will be heavily involved in preparing for incidents affecting their sectors. The Act requires them to cooperate and share information with other category one and two responders.
Local resilience forums	Local resilience forums (LRFs) covering police force areas are multi-agency partnerships made up of representatives of the local category one and two responders, plus the military. They are responsible for identifying and planning for local civil resilience risks.
Preparedness/resilience	The concept of ensuring organisations and areas are prepared for emergencies, and focused on developing the resilience and capability to respond to and withstand them.
Response	The multi-agency processes and procedures that are put in place to respond to an emergency. The generic national framework for managing emergency response and recovery identifies three tiers of management and the relationship between them, as set out below.

Recovery	Recovery is the process of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating a community following an emergency, and is typically led by the local authority.
Strategic/Strategic Coordination Group (SCG) – ‘gold command’	<p>The strategic management response considers the emergency in its wider context and determines long term impacts and risks; defines and communicates the overarching strategy and objectives for the response; establishes the framework, policy and parameters for lower level tiers, and monitors the context, risks, impacts and progress towards defined objectives.</p> <p>A multi-agency SCG, typically chaired by the chief officer of the police or fire service and usually attended by the local authority chief executive or strategic director, will be established for significant or extended emergencies. An SCG does not have the collective authority to issue commands or executive orders to individual responder agencies, but ensures coordination as each organisation exercises control of their own operations in the normal way.</p> <p>For emergencies with significant recovery implications, it would be normal to establish a recovery coordinating group (RCG), usually chaired by the council chief executive or strategic director, to take on the role of the SCG once the response phase of the emergency is over.</p>
Tactical/Tactical Coordination Group (TCG) – ‘silver’	<p>The tactical coordination group (TCG) will be formed from senior operational officers from relevant agencies. A council will usually be represented at the assistant director/ head of service level.</p> <p>The group's role is to jointly conduct the overall multi-agency management of the incident: determining priorities for allocating available resources and seeking additional resources if required; planning and coordinating tasks; assessing risks and using this to inform tasking of operational commanders; and ensuring the health and safety of the public/personnel.</p>
Operational – ‘bronze’	This is the level at which the management of the immediate hands-on work is undertaken at the site(s) of the emergency. While individual agencies retain command authority over their own resources and personnel deployed at the scene, each agency must liaise and coordinate with the other agencies involved, ensuring a coherent and integrated effort. It is the role of the operational commanders to implement the tactical commander's plan within their functional area of responsibility.
Cabinet Office Briefing Room – COBR	COBR is the name given to central government meetings convened in response to civil emergencies. The composition and chair of COBR will vary according to the nature and severity of an emergency, but a ministerial-level COBR may be chaired by the Prime Minister or senior minister. Officer-level meetings may also take place.
Mutual aid	Arrangements put in place between different organisations and areas to provide support in the event that one of them is required to respond to an emergency and requires additional resources.

Case studies

Manchester Arena attack **Manchester City Council**

On Monday 22 May 2017, a suicide bomber detonated an improvised device in the crowded foyer area immediately outside the Manchester Arena, where around 14,000 people had been attending an Ariana Grande pop concert. Twenty two people, including several children, were killed; over one hundred sustained physical injuries and many more suffered psychological and emotional trauma.

Manchester City Council responded to the incident as a category one responder, working in partnership with a vast range of other organisations, including those which form the Greater Manchester Resilience Forum. The council activated plans to establish a family assistance/reception centre at the Etihad Stadium and arranged hotel accommodation for families and professionals involved in the response. The council also worked with the local police force to coordinate contributions from businesses offering help and support.

The council's civic and community leadership in the immediate and longer term aftermath was a notable feature of the response, and was specifically praised in Lord Kerslake's review of the preparedness for and response to the attack. Among other things, the council arranged a vigil less than twenty four hours after the attack, ensured council staff were able to offer support to people at the St Ann's Square tribute site, arranged support for communities impacted by subsequent police raids in various parts of the city, oversaw a charity set up to support the

victims, and put in place measures to tackle the spike in hate crime that followed the attack.

Shoreham Bypass air crash **Adur District Council**

On 22 August 2015, a vintage jet aircraft crashed onto vehicles on the A27 during a display at the Shoreham Airshow, killing 11 people and injuring 16 others.

The aircraft broke into four parts on impact, destroying several cars. Fuel escaping from the fuel tanks ignited in a large fireball and plume of smoke immediately following the impact. Following the crash, the A27 was closed in both directions, stranding those attending the airshow. People were initially able to leave the site only on foot, as the main access from the car parks to the A27 was closed.

Initially the role of Adur and Worthing Councils was to support the emergency services and West Sussex County Council as the tier one and two responders whilst keeping council services running as normal. Council officers also established a stand-alone website for a virtual book of condolence and together with West Sussex County Council opened a charitable fund to support victims of the accident, to be administered by the Sussex Community Foundation, a registered charity.

Storm Eva flooding Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council

On Boxing Day 2015 Storm Eva reached Calderdale, causing flooding across 20 miles of the Calder Valley. Some 2,000 homes and 1,000 businesses flooded and large areas were without power for several days. The severity of the damage in Calderdale meant that the council led the discussion with the Department for Transport, on behalf of the whole region, on the cost of the repairs required to restore critical infrastructure.

Calderdale Council is the Lead Local Flood Authority (LLFA) and implemented emergency plans in partnership with the emergency services, Environment Agency, Canal and River Trust, Yorkshire Water, Northern Powergrid and local community groups.

Within hours local volunteers, with council support, had set up hubs in Todmorden, Hebden Bridge, Mytholmroyd, Sowerby Bridge and Elland, which quickly became the heart of each community, providing food, warmth, advice and support to the devastated communities.

Calderdale has local flood groups, with dedicated flood wardens and community based flood stores, which allowed the clean up to get underway as soon as the floodwater had gone.

The council coordinated the collection and removal of tonnes of waste and debris from across the valley and provided skips for residents and businesses. The highways team inspected the street lights, traffic lights and over 100 bridges in the flood affected areas, including 85 underwater inspections. Grants were swiftly made available by the Government and allocated to residents and businesses to contribute to the cost of the clean-up. Funding of approximately £13.2 million was awarded to support households and businesses through recovery schemes and council tax and business rates relief. Grant funding also made properties more resilient and helped affected businesses invest in their expansion.

The scale of the flooding and the subsequent damage to the highways network meant the council's priority quickly became focused on raising sufficient funding from regional organisations and central government to support the recovery. £25 million Department for Transport infrastructure funding was secured to repair damaged roads, bridges and landslips and make improvements to drainage.

The council delivered marketing campaigns targeting tourists, visitors and businesses to show that Calderdale was back in business and £100,000 was awarded to local organisations for events to help towns and communities recover and bring people together.

The Calderdale Flood Action Plan was published in October 2016 following consultation with the community and partner organisations to set out the actions required to improve Calderdale's resilience to flooding. It is a living document that is reviewed annually, with project leads from the council, Environment Agency and partner organisations reporting quarterly on their progress.

Continued efforts to secure funding are supporting the delivery of three major flood defence schemes in Mytholmroyd, Hebden Bridge and Brighouse, as well as smaller schemes across 22 locations. Work is ongoing to identify and maintain critical flood risk assets and improve the resilience of Calderdale's infrastructure across highways and transport, gas, electric and water, and the use of canals and reservoirs for flood storage is also being investigated.

Partner organisations are working to better understand the relationships between catchment management and flooding, engage with landowners and land managers and bid for funding to support the delivery of natural flood management (NFM) techniques. The partnership also works closely with the community to make people and property as prepared as possible for future flooding and help strengthen Calderdale's already active network of flood groups.

Overview and key themes for councillors

Summary of council responsibilities

All principal councils are category one responders under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. They have clearly defined responsibilities in relation to civil emergencies and will typically lead the recovery from any emergency in their area. Category one responders must:

- assess the risk of emergencies occurring and use this to inform contingency planning
- put in place emergency plans
- put in place business continuity management arrangements
- put communications arrangements in place to make information available to the public about civil protection matters and maintain arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public in the event of an emergency
- share information with other local responders to enhance coordination
- cooperate with other local responders to enhance coordination and efficiency
- provide advice and assistance to businesses and voluntary organisations about business continuity management (local authorities only).

As a category one responder, a council must perform its duties under the Act where:

- the emergency would be likely to seriously obstruct its ability to perform its functions
- it would consider it necessary or desirable to act to prevent, reduce, control, or mitigate the emergency's effects, or otherwise take action; and it would be unable to act without changing the deployment of its resources or acquiring additional resources.

Local responders work to a generic national framework for managing emergency response and recovery that applies regardless of the size, nature or cause of an emergency. The framework provides local flexibility for responders to make their own decisions about what emergency planning arrangements are appropriate to deliver their duties under the Act, based on local circumstances, priorities and risks. Local resilience forums (LRFs) are the key organisation for developing area wide arrangements for responding to emergencies, and are responsible for producing community risk registers setting out specific local risks for their areas and local multi-agency emergency response plans.

Councillor role

In an emergency, as with business as usual, councillors are not involved in the operational response led by officers but must play a leadership role that includes:

- **political leadership**; ensuring that their council is meeting its obligations under the Act, in terms of preparing for and responding to emergencies
- **civic leadership**; providing a focal point for the local area during an emergency situation
- **community leadership**; helping to increase community resilience, and supporting communities' emergency responses and through the period of recovery.

Councils and councillors may be required to deal with many different types of civil emergency, and the nature of an emergency (eg, whether it has involved loss of life, whether homes and businesses have had to

be evacuated) will clearly shape the response and recovery to it. These different situations will also impact how councillors are able to fulfil their roles. As an example, it is inevitable that more information will be made available – to both councillors and the public – about a flooding incident than a detailed police investigation into a terrorist attack. Councillors will need to understand how these differences affect response and recovery; however the principles of effective political, civic and community leadership will remain the same.

Political leadership

Senior political leaders in a council should ensure that councils are managerially equipped and resourced to plan for, respond to and recover from emergencies. This will involve making significant policy and funding decisions to help plan for emergencies, and promoting joint working and mutual aid arrangements with other local authorities and agencies. In a response situation, it will include supporting officers to respond to emergencies, enabling them to defend key decisions and helping to minimise reputational risk to the authority. Political leaders may also be required to consider resourcing recommendations from the strategic or recovery coordination groups or make representations to government for additional financial resources or other assistance. Finally, political leaders must also ensure recovery functions are mainstreamed and that lessons learnt are addressed and shared more widely.

Civic leadership

The emergencies which councils responded to in 2017 highlighted the critical significance of councils' civic leadership as a key feature of an effective emergency response and recovery.

The council's civic leadership role means providing a visible focal point for the local area during this period, offering information, support, reassurance and comfort, and standing alongside representatives of different communities and organisations. Media and communications will be a critical enabler of the council's civic leadership role.

Community leadership

Visible and empathetic community leadership by ward councillors at a very local level is hugely important. Community leadership cuts across preparedness, response and recovery; councillors need to understand their communities, local vulnerabilities, community networks, assets and businesses to help develop their community's resilience, and then use this information and capacity to inform and support an emergency response if it becomes necessary.

The advent of social media has increased opportunities for effective communication with local residents, but – again as highlighted by the 2017 emergencies and illustrated later in this document – can also create challenges for councils and councillors. Councillors should bear in mind general guidance on using social media, working closely with their communications teams and avoid pitfalls such as providing unverified information.

Community leadership will also be crucial as communities rebuild and move through periods of recovery, when ward councillors can act both as the voice of the community within the council, and vice versa.

Preparedness and resilience

Summary of council responsibilities

Councils should maintain a set of fully developed, tested and up to date plans covering a range of different scenarios, based on locally identified risks, to enable them to play a full and effective part in the response to and recovery from an emergency. In relation to potential flooding emergencies, councils have specific additional responsibilities, which are summarised in Appendix 1.

It is vital that councils understand their capability and capacity in this area. Emergency and business continuity plans should be regularly revisited to check they reflect current capability and that key contact details are up to date and easily available. Despite the many demands on their time, it is clearly extremely valuable for councillors to receive emergency planning training and briefings, and for senior officers to take part in training exercises. This process can also help ensure understanding of the relative roles and responsibilities of councillors and officers¹, which will strengthen councils' ability to respond to an emergency and help ensure corporate resilience. Unless everyone has thought through their role during a crisis and the recovery, there is a risk that in an emergency, they will be on the back foot.

¹ Emergency plans in areas with directly elected mayors should also be updated to reflect the potential role of the mayor, particularly in relation to communications and civic leadership.

“It was clear that previous training initiatives were helping our staff deal with a difficult situation ‘on the ground’, supporting the first and second tier response agencies while keeping our own services running as normal. Regular training, even on desktop exercises, is very important in helping staff and councillors think about the issues they may have to face and, should the worst happen, vital to give them the skills they need to make critical decisions.”

Councillor Neil Parkin Leader
Adur District Council
(Shoreham Bypass air crash)

Councils can also strengthen their preparedness for dealing with emergencies by developing strong links with the other agencies and groups that they may need to work with in the event of an emergency. Councils should ensure that they are actively engaging in the local resilience forum (LRF) and investing in the relationships that are critical for partnership working during the response phase of an emergency. Authorities should also develop robust mutual aid arrangements that can be drawn on when responding to an emergency requires additional capacity and support.

Councils should also ensure that they are developing the strong relationships with other groups likely to become involved in the response to an emergency, such as the voluntary sector, religious groups and other community groups. Councils will be doing this anyway, but it is important to understand the role this might play in the event of an emergency.

The councils that experienced terrorist attacks in 2017 were able to move quickly to hold public vigils and memorials that brought communities to visibly stand together because of the relationships they already had.

Role of leaders and portfolio holders

Clearly, senior councillors will have an important role to play in the tasks outlined above, particularly understanding and shaping the respective role of politicians and senior officers during an emergency response and recovery. Experience has shown that where their respective roles have not been clearly established prior to an emergency, or where agreed roles are exceeded or disregarded, the coherence of the council's position is undermined. Senior councillors also have a key role in building relationships with local partner agencies and contacts.

Senior councillors should seek assurance that the council is prepared to deal with an emergency and has appropriate business continuity plans in place to continue to operate even where it is directly affected by an emergency (for example, if the council was gutted by a fire, as was the case at Melton District Council in 2008 and South Oxfordshire in 2015). Appendix 2 sets out a series of questions for which senior leaders may wish to seek comprehensive and substantial answers backed up by relevant documentation where appropriate.

To support emergency preparedness, senior political leaders should:

- Discuss with chief executives and senior officers the main risks to local communities, so they can promote and support key actions to increase resilience.
- Understand and support the work of the LRF in planning for emergencies by:
 - helping them to be aware of the needs of discrete groups and issues within communities
 - seeking assurance that the council has worked with the LRF to develop sufficient plans for response and

recovery work, and that the LRF regularly tests these plans and trains personnel by running training exercises.

- Help raise awareness amongst local communities and the general public about the risks posed by key issues, and the roles and responsibilities of different agencies that can be involved in managing risk and responding to an emergency, so that communities are reassured and have a better idea of who to turn to in the event of emergencies occurring.
- Work with the communications team to ensure familiarity with internal and external communications processes in an emergency and their role within this.
- Encourage all councillors to participate in training so they are prepared to respond to an emergency and get involved in recovery from it.
- Understand the functions, ways of working, priorities and constraints of other organisations and in particular, if possible and appropriate, build personal relationships with key personnel, which will facilitate effective working during a crisis and may support the development of mutual aid arrangements with other organisations.
- Explore with the chief executive and senior officers whether contracts with suppliers include clear provisions requiring comprehensive plans for continuing service provision in the event of a civil emergency and for assisting with the response to and recovery from an emergency as appropriate and required; for example:
 - care providers should be expected to have across-the-board arrangements for continuity of care in the event of an emergency, including provisions to evacuate care homes and how these provisions would work
 - street cleaning and waste collection contracts should include provision for vehicles and equipment to be used in support of response to and recovery from an emergency.

The ward councillor role

As representatives of their local communities, ward councillors can help to build community resilience and strengthen councils' ability to respond to emergencies by developing an understanding of their local areas and building relationships within them.

Ward councillors will need to be familiar with the council and LRF's emergency response plans and, as with senior politicians, have an important role to play in seeking assurance about corporate council preparedness for responding to a civil emergency. Wherever possible, they should also contribute to the emergency planning process, undertake training and participate in exercises to ensure that they are familiar with what will be expected in an emergency.

However the emphasis for ward councillors is on a very local and outward facing community leadership role. Understanding and mapping communities – for example, where there are particularly vulnerable residents, what community assets there are that can be drawn on in an emergency, key local networks and organisations and how to quickly contact them – will help to ensure rapid and effective emergency responses. These are neighbourhood mapping activities that ward councillors may be undertaking as a general part of their role, but it is useful to consider them in the specific context of an emergency response.

Ward councillors also have a role to play in sharing information with local residents and helping them to think about and understand how they can strengthen community resilience. As part of their representative role for their area at the council, they can champion resilience in other local services, for example new developments in the area, and ensure that the LRF is aware of any particular issues or risks in their communities.

To support emergency preparedness, ward councillors should:

- promote and encourage the preparation of community plans
- use their local knowledge to identify local groups and partners who may be able to play a role in recovery
- promote self-resilience within the community and help manage residents' expectations
- actively engage with community members involved in community resilience work more widely
- take part in emergency response and recovery training exercises
- ensure they are familiar with the communications team emergency plans and processes
- scrutinise emergency plans and hold officers to account for the detailed preparation and updating of them with partners on the LRF – Appendix 3 sets out a set of possible scrutiny questions.

Response

Summary of council responsibilities

In an emergency scenario, the value of councils and councillors having invested time in planning and preparation, and in understanding where there are particularly vulnerable residents and communities, will become clear. Depending on the nature of an emergency, the 'blue light' services – police, fire and rescue and ambulance – may be at the forefront of the multi-agency response efforts. However, councils have responsibility for key activities that facilitate the response and support those impacted by the emergency. Much of this support will overlap with recovery activities, which councils will typically lead, which is why it is helpful to plan and begin recovery work as soon as possible during the response phase. Councils' response activities may include:

- Providing immediate shelter and welfare for survivors not requiring medical support, and their families and friends, via evacuation, rest, humanitarian and other centres to meet their immediate to short term needs², including providing access to telephones, computers and help with correspondence.
- Potentially providing catering facilities, toilets and rest rooms for use by all agencies, for the welfare of emergency

² Under homelessness legislation councils have a duty to secure suitable accommodation for people until a settled home becomes available. This means that in the event of an emergency, they have a responsibility for providing temporary shelter in the first instance and subsequently temporary accommodation in an extended emergency. Councils, registered social landlords and housing trusts have a duty to cooperate in providing assistance on request, where a housing authority asks for help with meeting its homelessness function.

response personnel, in the event of a protracted emergency. This will depend on the circumstances and available premises.

- Liaising with the coroner's office to provide emergency mortuary capacity in the event that existing mortuary provision is exceeded.
- Communicating relevant updates to the public for information and reassurance.
- Coordinating the activities of the various voluntary sector agencies involved, and spontaneous volunteers, potentially through the creation of a sub-group to lead this.
- Making arrangements for the receipt and distribution of donations of cash, clothing, furniture, etc (this role could be undertaken by the voluntary sector).
- Providing medium to longer-term welfare support of those impacted by the emergency, eg) setting up a dedicated resource centre/one-stop-shop with social services support and other service providers, particularly the voluntary sector and dedicated case workers; setting up help lines, and liaising with police and crime commissioners' offices in relation to support for victims of crime.³
- Providing public health advice and support.
- Providing investigating and enforcement officers under the provision of the Food and Environment Protection Act 1985 as requested by Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra).
- Facilitating the inspection of dangerous structures to ensure that they are safe for

³ Where an emergency relates to an incident which is the subject of a police investigation and could lead to a prosecution, victims have a statutory entitlement to support under the Victims Code. This support is the responsibility of police and crime commissioners.

emergency personnel to enter.

- Cleaning up pollution and facilitating the remediation and reoccupation of sites or areas affected by an emergency.

“The flooding we experienced on Boxing Day 2015 was unprecedented. We were badly hit by floods in 2012. At the time these were also described as unprecedented, but it is clear that what was previously a once in 100 years event, or even once in every 50 years, is now happening with much greater frequency. Many homes and small businesses have been flooded several times over the past few years and I know that it has been a struggle.

Council staff, communities and volunteers supported each other during the clean-up operation and established community hubs in the five towns affected by floods. The council dealt with dangerous, flood damaged structures, cleared tonnes of debris and silt and provided assistance packages to householders and local businesses.”

Councillor Tim Swift Leader
Calderdale Council

Recent experience highlights the importance of effective management of public facing responsibilities in providing assurance about the handling of the emergency. Regular and empathetic communication; the close involvement of the voluntary sector, and effective coordination of volunteers and donations are all key to enabling councils to provide practical and emotional support whilst also fulfilling their statutory duties.

Media and communications

Councils can show civic leadership and relay information through intelligent and sensitive use of communications. This should be delivered through a variety of different channels to reach as wide an audience as possible, including traditional print communication, social media, local and national media channels, councillor led community and civic events, public meetings and leaflet or newsletter drops. Maintaining good relations with the media will be more important than ever during and after an emergency, and councils should:

- agree and use key messages consistently across all communications, including agreeing key messages across LRF and first responder organisations
- use the front page of the council website to clearly direct residents and press to up to date information regarding the emergency, with clear signposts of where to go for further information if needed, and relevant contact details for other organisations
- monitor social media, retweeting information from other partner organisations where relevant
- ensure that regular updates are disseminated to all councillors and staff via intranet/ line managers and that front line staff are briefed to deliver key messages to residents.

“One of the most important learnings from the tragic events at the Shoreham Air Show was the need to ensure that communications were regular and consistent – whether between members and officers, the council and its partners, or the council and the media. If clear, concise and accurate information hadn’t been available when it was needed, the potential for causing additional distress in the community could have been enormous.

It was imperative that our messages were aligned with and interview candidates were aware of what was being said by other agencies, so that we could put on a united front during the response phase. We had to balance the needs of our local community with the desire for information from national agencies (who didn’t understand local nuance) so that lines of communication and action remained clear.

I was initially taken aback by the media appetite for information – we received requests for interviews from across the country within hours of the tragedy unfolding, and these kept coming throughout the days and weeks that followed. It was incredibly important to have agreed a number of members, who could field media interview requests, in advance with our communications team – this ensured that there was clarity and consistency for our community in who they were receiving messages from.”

Councillor Neil Parkin Leader
Adur District Council

Financial assistance

The Government operates a mechanism for emergency financial assistance to help local authorities to cover immediate costs they incur in responding to emergencies. The Bellwin Scheme may be activated by ministers where an emergency:

- involves the destruction of, or danger to, life or property, and as a result
- one or more councils incur expenditure on or in connection with the taking of immediate action to safeguard life or property, or to prevent suffering or severe inconvenience, in their area or among inhabitants.

It is important to note that the Bellwin Scheme doesn’t cover precautionary actions or the recovery from an emergency; is subject to an expenditure threshold (which is published annually), and only applies in England. In Wales it is known as the Emergency Financial Assistance Scheme and is administered by the Welsh Government.

Role of leaders and portfolio holders

When an emergency occurs, senior politicians, as leaders of local places, have a vital role in providing civic leadership and reassurance to local people. Depending on the emergency, the council may become a lightning rod for emotions, and will need to manage this effectively. Visibility of senior politicians will be important, and the communications strategy should be seen as facilitating the civic leadership role.

Senior councillors in particular will also have an important role during the immediate response phase in supporting officers and councillor colleagues, who are likely to be working exceptionally hard over long periods with limited breaks, potentially in emotionally difficult circumstances. Providing simple human support and recognising when individuals – including themselves – need a period of respite are important, and link back to the need to have clearly defined roles and responsibilities.

To support emergency responses, senior political leaders should:

- Ensure that the council continues to deliver services and provide support to the most vulnerable in the community and to those driven out of their homes.
- Work with the council's communication team to act as a public face for the council in interactions with the media and the wider community through interviews and public meetings. It will be particularly important to take care to avoid issuing contradictory or unconfirmed information to the media and the public. The key messages agreed with the communications team should be clearly and consistently reiterated in all communications, including social media and face to face interactions with residents.
- Assist with VIP visits, ensuring they are sensitive to the needs of the community.
- Work with the council's communications team to keep onsite and remote staff and councillors informed by ensuring internal communications are updated in line with external communications.
- Ensure that the council is fully and effectively cooperating with all relevant partners, not least the voluntary sector and making best use of all the support offered by the wider general public.
- Support officers and colleagues who are closely involved in the emergency response and recovery, ensuring that periods of relief and additional support are provided.
- If appropriate, make representation to the government for financial or other assistance.

The ward councillor role

The community leadership role is critical when an area is significantly impacted by an emergency. Councillors can play a role in signposting communities to support, including working to ensure that vulnerable residents in particular are assisted.

Again, preparatory work – in this case to understand community vulnerabilities and assets – will pay dividends in an emergency scenario.

The most important role for local councillors in the event of an emergency will be to be in their communities, providing support and reassurance to residents, calming tensions if these have become inflamed and providing as much information as possible, including correcting inaccuracies and rumours. Ward councillors should also provide moral support to the council officers working in what may be a challenging and difficult emergency response scenario, but should remember that, as with the delivery of services during business as usual, the elected member role is not to be involved in the operational response led by officers.

Feedback from councillors and officers involved in emergency responses has emphasised the importance of regular communication by ward councillors, for example using social media and in person. Councillors will need to have realistic expectations about the information that will be available to them if the emergency involves a major criminal investigation, such as a terrorist attack, but should be open with residents about the level of information that is available and provide regular updates, even if the update is that there is no further news at that time.

Experience suggests that if residents have had to evacuate, the key concern for them will be when they can return to their homes, and that it is advisable to avoid offering anything other than firm details on this. Information that subsequently turns out to be false assurances or over promising can significantly impact reputation and trust.

It is also worth bearing in mind that while councillors have a clear and legitimate role to scrutinise the council's corporate response to an emergency, actions that are perceived to be seeking political advantage may not be appropriate at this time.

To support emergency responses, ward councillors in affected areas should:

- provide community leadership in their own wards
- be present locally to identify the needs of individuals and the wider community and feed them in to the appropriate response or recovery organisation via council officers
- signpost members of the public towards the right agency to get the support they need
- communicate information to the public and media as required by the communications team
- support and assist those affected in how they engage with the media.

The Manchester community came together to show solidarity with those affected by the attack and to show that the city was united. The council quickly took action to provide a focus for this support. The vigil in Albert Square was held less than 24 hours after the attack and was so important as a first step to the city's recovery.

Councillor Sue Murphy,
Deputy Leader, Manchester City Council

Recovery

Summary of council responsibilities

Ideally recovery work, or at least preparations for it, should begin from the moment the emergency begins and initially run alongside the response phase, although the formal close-down of response and a full transition to recovery will not take place until the emergency services withdraw and responsibility transfers to the local authority.

Recovery is more than simply the replacement of what has been destroyed and the rehabilitation of those affected. It is a complex social and development process which will look different for each type of emergency. Indeed, for some emergencies, there is a need to be careful about the language of 'recovery'; some people will never fully recover, either physically or emotionally, from their experience of a terrorist attack or similarly catastrophic event. However, it should also be recognised that the recovery process can provide opportunities as well as creating challenges, including improving local places through redevelopment, as well as developing and strengthening community links and resilience.

Recovery will be multi-faceted and may be long running, potentially involving many more agencies and participants than the response phase. It will certainly be more costly in terms of resources, and it will undoubtedly be subject to close scrutiny from the community and the media. Having begun at the earliest opportunity it should continue until the disruption has been rectified, demands on services have returned to normal levels, and the needs of those affected (directly and

indirectly) have been met. It could last months or even years and will normally be led by the council, usually with the chief executive or appropriate strategic director taking the chair of the recovery coordination group.

During recovery councils will have a large part to play in addressing community needs via drop-in centres and, if appropriate, organising anniversaries and memorials as part of the recovery effort. Establishing an aftercare group as a sub group of the recovery coordination group can help to provide emotional support to victims, including responders. For example, this could include setting up community support or self-help groups for people who want to talk about the incident; planning events to bring displaced communities together, or providing a care and counselling service. While this group might be initiated by the council, it may be led by the voluntary sector.

Councils are expected to make arrangements to bear the costs of recovery in all but the most exceptional circumstances. The Government is clear that it is up to councils to assess their own risk and put in place the right mix of insurance, self-insurance, and reserves. In the event of an exceptional emergency however, individual departments, eg the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG), Department for Education (DfE), Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) and Department for Transport (DfT) will consider providing financial support for various aspects of the recovery effort.

It should be noted that departments will not pay out for recovery costs that are insurable. There will be no automatic entitlement to financial assistance even if arrangements are activated. Councils will have to demonstrate need against criteria laid down by the department running a particular scheme. Also the Government will not normally pay out against costs relating to areas where there is already an established government spending programme, or where existing programme spend can be re-prioritised.

Role of leaders and portfolio holders

Senior political leaders will need to maintain a visible leadership role during the recovery period, reflecting that although media interest may have moved on, the effects experienced locally will last much longer. Political leadership will need to be sensitive to the needs of communities in reflecting when it is time to resume, as far as possible, a business as usual approach in the local community (for example, the removal of any temporary memorials that have been created), even as recovery efforts continue.

Making the case for financial assistance to support recovery processes may be a particularly important role following a major emergency that has created significant costs.

Political leaders should also play a prominent role in capturing the learning from the council's experience of responding to the emergency, in terms of what worked well, what worked less well, and how things could be improved in a future emergency response.

To support the recovery process following an emergency, senior leaders should ensure that:

- Resources and agencies are being effectively deployed and working together coherently.
- Council services and operations return to normal at the earliest appropriate opportunity.
- Communities that have been disrupted by the emergency, and in particular the vulnerable members of the community, receive the short, medium and long term local support they need once the emergency is no longer national news and central government has shifted its attention elsewhere.
- The community are being kept well informed of plans and progress.
- Local voluntary sector organisations and the community are fully involved in the recovery process.
- A recovery strategy has been developed, supported by a concise, balanced, affordable recovery action plan that can be quickly implemented, involves all agencies, and fits the needs of the emergency.
- An impact assessment has been started early with councillors playing a central role in identifying problems and vulnerabilities in their community, which may require priority attention, and feeding those problems and vulnerabilities back to the relevant recovery group. The impact assessment is likely to develop over time from an initial outline assessment, probably covering the more immediate needs of people, to a more refined assessment of longer- term humanitarian needs and economic development
- Lessons learnt from the emergency are being compiled, widely shared and acted upon; follow up actions might include revision of plans, further training, strengthening of liaison with other agencies.

- Thorough debriefs are being planned and carried out to capture issues identified, recommendations to be implemented, and planning assumptions to be reviewed.
- That the community (including businesses) is involved at all stages of recovery; elected members can play a key role in this, chairing public (and business) debrief meetings; they can also be useful for door-knocking rounds, bringing back issues that the community has identified, and providing a trusted point of contact for those with concerns.
- Information and media management of the recovery process is coordinated by the communications team.
- Frequent internal communications keep all onsite and remote staff and councillors updated with key messages.
- Effective protocols for political involvement and liaison (parish, district/county/unitary, combined authority/mayoral and parliamentary) are established.

The ward councillor role

As community representatives and figureheads in their local community, councillors for the affected community have an important role to play in assisting with the recovery process. The role of councillors is vital to rebuilding, restoring, rehabilitating and reassuring the communities affected and speaking on their behalf, and this phase will therefore require a more significant role than for the operational response activities.

During the recovery process, ward councillors will need to represent their communities within the council, as well as representing the council within their communities, sharing information and feedback on proposals and decisions.

An important part of their role will be to monitor the longer term community impact of the emergency, and any specific concerns or tensions which have arisen that need to be addressed.

To support the recovery process, all councilors in the affected areas should:

- Listen to the community – as councillors and local figureheads, they have a key role as the voice of the community and can therefore:
 - be the eyes and ears ‘on the ground’ by providing a focus for and listening to community concerns and feeding these in appropriately
 - provide support and reassurance to the local community, by listening or visiting those affected and acting as a community champion and supporter.
- Use local knowledge – as a member of the community, councillors have unique access to the thoughts and opinions of, and information relating to their local community. As such, they can play a part in using:
 - local awareness of the thoughts and feelings of the community to identify problems and vulnerabilities the community may have and which may require priority attention and feeding them back to the relevant recovery sub-group, eg the community recovery committee
 - local knowledge to provide information on local resources, skills and personalities to the relevant recovery sub-group, in particular local community groups which can also be an important source of help and specialist advice; working closely with community groups, councillors will also be valuable in knowing how and who is active within a community.
- Provide support to those working on recovery through:
 - providing encouragement and support to recovery teams working within the community
 - working with the communications team to communicate key messages, from the RCG and its sub-groups, to local and national press and to disseminate credible advice and information back

to the community, keeping community members involved, including potentially assisting in debrief sessions with the community and managing community expectations along with the wider council

- actively engaging with community members involved in the recovery efforts.
- Demonstrate political leadership:
 - through scrutiny – getting buy-in and closure at political level, including sign off for funding
 - presenting the case for their community to the strategic community recovery committee where relevant.

“Nearly three years on, we’re working on a much more strategic, comprehensive scale to minimise future flooding and strengthen the resilience of our communities. By working closely with our partner organisations, we are delivering targeted flood alleviation schemes, improving the resilience of our highways and utilities infrastructure, managing our uplands to slow the flow of water into the valley bottoms, and helping communities to be better prepared the next time flooding hits.”

Councillor Tim Swift Leader
Calderdale Council

Appendix 1 – specific flooding related responsibilities

County councils and unitary authorities are lead local flood authorities (LLFAs) and have duties under the Flood Water Management Act 2010 (FWMA).

Under the FWMA, LLFAs are required to:

- Develop, maintain, apply and monitor a strategy for local flood risk management in their areas. Local flood risk means risk from surface run off, ground water and ordinary watercourses.
- Cooperate with other risk management authorities in exercising their local flood risk management functions. Risk management authorities are LLFAs, the Environment Agency, water and sewerage companies, highways authorities, internal drainage boards and district councils.
- Maintain a register of assets – the physical structures or features that are likely to have a significant effect on flooding in their area, including information for each of them about ownership and state of repair.
- Investigate significant local flooding incidents and publish the results of such investigations.

LLFAs also:

- are statutory consultees on planning applications for major development (10 dwellings or more) proposals which have surface water drainage implications
- manage both consenting and enforcement activity related to altering, removing or replacing certain structures or features on ordinary watercourses (except in those areas covered by an internal drainage board).

LLFAs and the Environment Agency need to work closely together to ensure that their local and national strategies and plans are consistent with one another. An essential part of managing local flood risk is taking account of new development in any local plans or strategies.

By working in partnership with communities, LLFAs can raise awareness of flood and coastal erosion risks. Local flood action groups (and other organisations that represent those living and working in areas at risk of flooding) will be useful and trusted channels for sharing up-to-date information, guidance and support direct with the community.

LLFAs should encourage local communities to participate in local flood risk management.

Depending on local circumstances, this could include developing and sharing good practice in risk management, training community volunteers so that they can raise awareness of flood risk in their community, and helping the community to prepare flood action plans. LLFAs must also consult local communities and any risk management authorities that may be affected about their local flood risk management strategy.

If a flood happens, all councils as ‘category one responders’ must have plans in place not only to respond to flooding emergencies, but also to control or reduce the impact of a flooding emergency.

Appendix 2 – possible questions for leaders/portfolio holders to raise

- How engaged is the council in the LRF?
- Are there sufficient officers at each level appropriately trained to participate in multi-agency coordinating groups?
- Are all senior staff aware of what the council roles and responsibilities are in local resilience forum multi-agency emergency plans and is the council ready to deliver them?
- Have arrangements been made to enable close working with other councils within the LRF in the event of an emergency (eg information sharing, shared communications plan, joint spokespeople, etc)?
- Has the council appropriately considered plans for leading the recovery from emergencies that may occur?
- Does the LRF have an up-to-date risk register and does it fully reflect risks faced by the council and incorporate climate change risks? Is it sufficiently detailed and comprehensive, written in plain English and understandable to the general public? Is it readily available to the public?
- Are there sufficient plans for preventing emergencies; and reducing, controlling or mitigating the effects of emergencies in both the response and recovery phases?
- Do the emergency plans fully reflect the identified risks?
- Do plans clearly identify vulnerable groups or businesses that are at particular risk?
- When were business continuity plans last checked, updated and tested?
- Is there a flood risk management strategy in place with adequate systems and resources to implement it?
- Is there sufficient up-to-date information on the website to enable residents to contact the council in an emergency during a normal working day and out of hours and does the website make clear to residents what they can expect from the council in a local civil emergency?
- When was the website last updated? Is it fully up-to-date and does it fully reflect current arrangements and points of contact?
- Does the council have arrangements to generate the resource to respond to calls from residents about short or no notice emergencies out of working hours, particularly during the holidays, eg over Christmas and the New Year?
- Are senior members of staff suitably trained in the implementation of the LRF's emergency plans and ready to respond in the event of an emergency?
- Are emergency contact numbers for all key personnel, including councillors, available and up-to-date?
- Are councillors aware of their role in responding to and recovering from an emergency and have they had a recent up-to-date communications brief on emergencies to enable them to fulfil their community leadership role and be well informed for any media contact?
- Are up-to-date and fit for purpose emergency and business continuity plans in place and are they coherent with local resilience forum plans?
- Have lessons learnt from previous emergencies across the country been identified and plans modified accordingly?

Appendix 3 – possible questions for scrutiny committees to consider

- How well is the council cooperating with other key organisations like the Environment Agency and the emergency services?
- Have risks to council buildings and facilities (eg schools, leisure centres, libraries, residential care homes, day centres) been properly identified and are mitigations and fall back plans in place?
- Is the council conducting active horizon scanning for new risks and working with the LRF to regularly update the risk register?
- Is the risk register sufficiently detailed and comprehensive, written in plain English and easily understandable by the general public?
- Is the council aware of the impact emergencies could have on local businesses and the local economy and does it have plans to mitigate the impact?
- Does the council have the wherewithal to be able to give advice to the commercial and voluntary sectors in the event of an emergency?
- Do plans include measures for preventing emergencies and for mitigating the impact of emergencies when they arise?
- Do plans reflect lessons learnt from previous emergencies across the country?
- Has the council appropriately considered plans for leading the recovery from emergencies that may occur?
- Have climate risks and opportunities been built into local growth plans?
- Has training been provided to councillors and has training offered been taken up?
- What assurance is there that the council has developed and practiced appropriate emergency and business continuity plans and are they coherent with the local resilience forum plans?
- When were the council's business continuity plans last tested and how frequently are such tests planned to be carried out?
- When was the last time the council participated in an exercise and when is the next exercise planned?
- When were response and recovery arrangements last reviewed to ensure that newly elected members and staff are fully briefed?
- What arrangements does the council have for scaling up the staff resource to not only support the response and recovery, but also maintain the delivery of front line services?
- Which officers have been appropriately trained to participate in coordination groups and is this sufficient to ensure that the council can participate fully in responding to and recovering from emergencies?

Appendix 4 – useful references

Local authorities' preparedness for civil emergencies – a good practice guide for chief executives (Solace / MHLCG)

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/759744/181116_LA_preparedness_guide_for_cx_v6.10__004_.pdf

Responsibilities of responder agencies and others – government guidance

www.gov.uk/guidance/preparation-and-planning-for-emergencies-responsibilities-of-responder-agencies-and-others

Emergency preparedness – government guidance

www.gov.uk/government/publications/emergency-preparedness

Emergency Response and Recovery: Non statutory guidance accompanying the Civil Contingencies Act 2004

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/253488/Emergency_Response_and_Recovery_5th_edition_October_2013.pdf

House of Commons briefing paper – dealing with civil contingencies

<http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-8016/CBP-8016.pdf>

LGA severe weather resources

www.local.gov.uk/topics/severe-weather/flooding

www.local.gov.uk/topics/severe-weather/heatwaves-information-councils

www.local.gov.uk/topics/severe-weather/cold-weather-plan-england

LGA councillor briefing pack – resilient communities: ensuring your community is resilient to the impacts of extreme weather

www.local.gov.uk/councillor-briefing-pack-resilient-communities

LGA guide for communicating during extreme weather

www.local.gov.uk/guide-communicating-during-extreme-weather

LGA crisis communications – cyber attack

www.local.gov.uk/our-support/guidance-and-resources/comms-hub-communications-support/cyber-attack-crisis

LGA councillor's guide to cyber security

www.local.gov.uk/councillors-guide-cyber-security



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London Prepared

Havering Borough Resilience Forum

HAVERING BOROUGH RISK REGISTER

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Havering Borough Resilience Forum
March 2022

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The Havering Borough Risk Register is collectively owned by the Category 1 Responders (as defined by Schedule 1 to the Civil Contingencies Act 2004) within the London Borough of Havering area.

Record of amendments

Date	Version	Author	Changes
July 2007	1.1	Havering EP and BC Service	Original Borough Risk Register produced in line with the North East London Local Resilience Forum Community Risk Register format.
May 2011	1.12	Havering EP and BC Service	Original Borough Risk Register produced by the Havering Emergency Services Liaison Panel transferred to the Havering Borough Resilience Forum with relevant changes made.
Jan 2012	2.00	Havering EP and BC Service	Six existing Community Risk Registers amalgamated into one London Community Risk Register. This Borough Risk Register has been reviewed and amended in line with the London Community Risk Register.
Feb 2014	2.1	Havering EP and BC Service	Control measures and review dates added to BRR. H22, H24a, H24b and HL102 removed. H54, H55, H56 and H58 added.
June 2014	2.2	Havering EP and BC Service	Malicious attacks added to BRR as X1 – X7. Risk positions amended in rating order within each category. HL 20 removed. L19 added.
Sept 2014	2.3	Havering EP and BC Service	BRR risk matrix aligned to the new NRA risk matrix, with some risks increasing and some decreasing in risk rating. H43 removed as per the NRA.
Jan 2015	2.4	Havering EP and BC Service	H5 and HL43 added. H49 removed.
Oct 2015	2.5	Havering EP and BC Service	H57 added.
Feb 2017	2.6	Havering EP and BC Service	H46 removed, HL 9b added
Feb 2018	2.7	Havering EP and BC Service	H46 re-instated. H30 removed. H62 Air quality added. H22 added and HL16/HL17/HL18/HL19 removed
June 2019	2.8	Havering CCRT	HL 28, HL14, HL12, HL43, H55, HL33, HL4 and HL25 removed. H60 Added
November 2019	2.9	Havering CCRT	Formatting of the Havering Risk Register adapted and hyperlinks added for ease. X1 changed to a Very High risk rating
March 2022	3.0	Havering CCRT	The new NSRA London Risk Register template has been adopted in line with version 11 of the LRR.

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1. Introduction and Background

1.1 Introduction

This Risk Register is used by the Havering Borough Resilience Forum to help the prioritisation of resilience activities towards higher rated risks.

Communities and businesses are also encouraged to use the Borough Risk Register to inform their own resilience arrangements and business continuity plans. It is for this reason that the Borough Risk Register is made publically available.

The risks included in the Havering Borough Risk Register represent 'reasonable worst case scenarios' and their inclusion in the register does not mean that they are going to happen, or that if they did do that they would be as serious as the descriptions included here. The Reasonable Worst Case scenarios are nationally developed and informed by historical and scientific data, modelling and trend surveillance and professional expert judgment. The Havering Borough Risk Register provides an assessment of the likelihood and impact of these scenarios for Havering.

The Havering Borough Risk Register does not include reference to pre-planned events, which are covered under separate guidance and risk assessments.

1.2 Risk assessment methodology

This version of the Havering Borough Risk Register uses the same methodology as the London Risk Register, using the national risk assessment methodology introduced in the 2019 National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA, available on Resilience Direct). This version assesses threats and non-malicious risks under the same methodology, using the same likelihood and impact scales. To accommodate the new threats and risks in this manner, some changes were made to the risk assessment methodology.

For more detail on the risk assessment methodology see [appendix 1](#).

1.3 Understanding the Risk Register

Risks are grouped by theme and presented in order of overall rating within that theme, with the highest risks first. Themes are based on common features and consequences, which makes it easier to understand the risk in context and to consider which risks might influence, or be influenced by, others. Risk themes are accidents and system failures, human and animal disease, societal risks, natural hazards, cyber-attacks, and terrorist threats.

The headings used on the Borough Risk Register are as follows:

Risk ID Rating	Sub-category Lead	Outcome Description	Likelihood Impact	Controls in Place	Last Review Next Review	Change Since last publication
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Risk ID: Unique reference number for each risk. R denotes risk is also a national risk.

Rating: Overall risk rating based on likelihood and impact.

Sub-category: in some cases risks are sub-categorised for ease of comparison with similar risks.

Lead: The organisation responsible for the assessment of the risk in London.

Outcome Description: A summary of the reasonable worst case scenario used to inform the assessment.

Likelihood: Assessed from 1-5 where 1 is the least likely and 5 more likely. (A table with probabilities associated with each score is available at the end of this document.)

Impact: Assessed from 1-5 where 1 is the lowest impact and 5 more impactful.

Controls in place: Plans and procedures in place to mitigate this risk

Last review / next review: Dates of the last review of that risk, and planned date for the next review.

Changes since last publication: Summary of changes to the risks since the last assessment.

1.4 Risk Review Schedule

All risks with an overall rating of “Very high” and “High” will be reviewed yearly, other risks will be reviewed every two years; review dates are in the right hand column of the register ([section 3](#)).

New risks will be reviewed the year after they are introduced to capture any new learning and will thereafter be reviewed yearly or every two years, as appropriate.

1.5 Controls

Controls specific to the type of incident referred to are listed in the register below. In addition, there are many generic plans, procedures and principles that aid multi-agency working in incident response and national initiatives that are used to aid responders in complex situations. These include:

- [London Emergency Services Liaison Panel](#) (LESLP)
- [Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles](#) (JESIP)
- Pan-London emergency response plans and frameworks available on [london.gov.uk](https://www.london.gov.uk) covering generic response procedures, consequence based planning for use in various incidents, and incident-specific plans.

2. New risks, removed risks and risks under review

Several risks introduced in the 2019 NSRA were raised to the attention of the London Fire Brigade (LFB) to lead on. The introduction of these risks prompted an in-depth review of LFB-led risks including detailed consideration of the national risks and whether these adequately cover London’s risk profile.

R54 Major Fire was a new risk on the London Risk Register in 2021, the London assessment for this was closely based on the national risk. It was decided that the description of the Reasonable Worst-Case Scenario of this risk was too broad, covering multiple settings which have different risk profiles in London, requiring different responses and therefore different risk assessments.

The London Risk Advisory Group have created four new risks which cover some of the separate

scenarios described in R54 in more detail. R54 will remain on the risk register for now, to reflect the risk as seen at a national level. New fire risks in the risk register are:

- L54a Fires in purpose built high-risk flats
- L54b Fires in large public and commercial buildings
- L54c Fires involving landfill and waste processing sites
- L54e Major fire in care homes and hospitals

'HL33 Wildfires' has been renamed 'L54d Wildfires in proximity to urban areas' to maintain numbering consistency with other fire risks.

Aviation risks have been re-structured and renamed to cover a wider range of scenarios possible in the vicinity to London's airports than previously captured. The national risk 'R71 Aviation Crash' remains on the LRR, with HL9 Aviation Crash reintroduced as L71a Large aircraft incident in proximity to airport and HL9b

A review of radiological risks found that the national risk 'R66 Radiation release from overseas nuclear accident' was too specific in the description of its RWCS and too large in scope to cover impacts and response actions from domestic radiation risks. A new risk has been introduced to cover local risks to London of the mishandling of radiological risks while in transport or in use:

- L66 Radioactive incident caused by mishandling of radioactive material

Two radiological risks are currently under review:

- R65 Civil Nuclear Accident currently under review as to whether it should be included on the LRR in addition to R66
- R66 Radiation release from overseas nuclear accident appears on the risk register using the national summary assessment and is currently under review by LRAG alongside R65.

The LFB's risk review also found cause to remove the following risks:

- HL25 Fire or explosion at a flammable gas terminal
- HL7 Industrial explosions and major fires

The RWCS for these are covered under three national risks; two of which were added to the LRR last year (R55 and R57) and also under R61 Fire and explosion at an onshore fuel pipeline which has been included this year to cover industrial fires and explosion scenarios.

There are several risks on the NSRA and the National Risk Register that are not assessed as part of the London Risk Assessment Process and therefore do not appear on the risk register. Some are out of scope of the London Risk Assessment, some are based on scenarios that are not applicable to London (e.g. the RWCS refers to infrastructure that does not exist in London). Some risks are not considered by LRFs as the response would be wholly owned by central government.

3. Havering Borough Risk Register: High-Level Summary Risk Matrix

Page 68	5		R84 Severe Drought, R20 Nuclear attack unenclosed urban area	R76 National Electricity Transmission, R95 Influenza-type Pandemic, R2 Conventional attack chemicals infrastructure, R7 Malicious attack on nuclear infrastructure, R14 Biological attack unenclosed area		
	4	R71 Aviation Crash, R55 Fire or Explosion at a fuel distribution site, R57 Explosion at a high-pressure gas pipeline, R74 Reservoir/Dam Collapse, R66 Radiation Release from overseas	R77 Gas Supply Infrastructure, R68 High Consequence Dangerous Goods, L54b Fires in large public and commercial buildings, R4 Attack on UK electricity infrastructure, R10 Malicious aviation incident, R11 Malicious maritime incident	R83 Surface Water Flooding, R92 Severe Space Weather, L21 Fluvial Flooding, R5 Conventional attack on government, R15 Malicious attack with building collapse, R17 Chemical attack enclosed area, R21 Radiological attack unenclosed area, R22 Strategic hostage taking		R19 Marauding terrorist attack
	3	HL23 Bridge Collapse, HL34 Evacuation of passenger ship, HL22 Building Collapse, R75 Water Supply Infrastructure, R64 Large Toxic Chemical Release, R61 Fire and Explosion at an onshore fuel pipeline, L66 Incident caused by mishandling of radioactive material	R69 Food Supply Contamination, R80 Systemic Financial Crisis, L64 Localised industrial accident involving small toxic release, R3 Attack on UK gas infrastructure, HL105 Complex Built Environments	R91 Low temperatures and heavy Snow, R96 Growth of Anti-Microbial resistance, R97 Emerging Infectious Disease, R85 Poor Air Quality, L19 Groundwater Flooding, HL19 Coastal/Tidal Flooding, R6 Malicious attack fuel infrastructure, R9 Chemical attack on water infrastructure, R12 Malicious rail network incident, R23 Chemical attack unenclosed area	R90 Heatwave, R87 Volcanic Eruption, R54 Major Fire, R63 Accidental Release of a Biological Substance, L54a Fires in purpose built high-rise flats, R16 Person borne IED	R104 Public Disorder, R28 Cyber-attack on health and social care system
	2	R67 Maritime Pollution, R62 Accidental Release of Biological Pathogen, R103 Insolvency affecting fuel supply	R78 Disruption to telecoms systems, R98 Animal Disease, R102 Industrial Action (fuel), HL10 Local Accident on Motorways/ Major Trunk Roads, R99 Industrial Action (firefighters),	L54d Wildfires, L54e Major fire in care homes and hospitals, R93 Storms and Gales, HL11 Railway Accident, HL21 Land Movement, R101 Industrial action public transport, L71b Small Aircraft Incident, R30 Cyber-attack on telecommunications systems, R13 Anthrax letters, R18 High profile assassination	R105 Influx of British Nationals, R72 Collapse of major government contractor, R73 Major Social care Provider, R79 Technological failure at a retail bank, R100 Industrial action (prison officers)	L54c Fires involving landfill and waste processing sites
	1	R70 Radiation exposure from stolen goods, R94 Earthquake	R29 Cyber-attack SWIFT system	R43 Undermining democratic activity, R25 Cyber-attack Gov't critical systems, R26 Cyber-attack Gov't data breach	R27 Cyber-attack incident - transport	
Impact		1 - Low	2 - Medium/Low	3 - Medium	4 - Medium/High	5 - High
		Likelihood				

4. Havering Borough Risk Register

4.1 Accidents and system failures

Risk ID Rating	Sub-category Lead	Outcome Description	Likelihood	Impact	Controls in Place	Last Review Next Review
R76 VERY HIGH Page 69	Systems Failure LFB	National Electricity Transmission A total national blackout due to the loss of the GB National Electricity Transmission System caused by damage to or technical failure of the transmission network. The technical recovery process (Black Start) could take up to 5 days; however, there is the potential for wide area power disruptions for up to 14 days, potentially affecting millions of consumers.	3	5	Testing and maintenance regime. London Power Supply Disruption Plan EDF Energy System Emergency Plan. EDF Energy Emergency Communication Plan. EDF Energy Black Start Plan. Business Continuity Plans for Category 1 and 2 Responders, businesses and other key organisations London Power Supply Disruption Plan Major Incident/Emergency Plans for Category 1 and 2 Responders.	Nov 2019 Sept 2022

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Risk ID Rating	Sub-category Lead	Outcome Description	Likelihood	Impact	Controls in Place	Last Review Next Review
R54 HIGH	Accident LFB	Major Fire A major fire in a building resulting in up to 140 fatalities and 200 casualties, significant damage to the building affected and disruption to local transport services for up to a week.	4	3	Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 Fire Safety Approved Document B Fire & Rescue Services Act 2004 LFB Guidance Note 29 LFB Operational tactical and building plans LFB Urban Search & Rescue Teams (USAR) Fire Service National Resilience Assets LAS Hazardous Area Response Team (HART) Local Authority Dangerous Structures Engineer Casualty Bureau London Frameworks including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strategic Coordination Protocol Mass Fatalities Framework Mass Casualties Framework Humanitarian Assistance Framework	Sept 2021 Sept 2022
L54a HIGH	Fire LFB	Fires in purpose built high-rise flats Major fire in block of flats containing 80 compartments. Potential for 150-200 fatalities and 200 casualties.	4	3	See R54	Sept 2021 Sept 2022
L54b HIGH	Fire LFB	Fires in large public and commercial buildings Fire in large public building e.g. nightclub, sports stadium, shopping centre, transport hub or other. Potential for up to 50 fatalities and 50 casualties.	2	4	See R54	Sept 2021 Sept 2022

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Risk ID Rating	Sub-category Lead	Outcome Description	Likelihood	Impact	Controls in Place	Last Review Next Review
R68 HIGH	HAZMAT LFB	High consequence dangerous goods A road or rail tanker containing dangerous goods and/or “high consequence” dangerous goods is involved in an accident leading to fire and an explosion. Up to 200 fatalities and up to 500 people requiring medical treatment. The explosion will cause varying degrees of damage to property and infrastructure depending on their distance from the incident. This risk would result in a toxic plume/gas cloud which would be harmful to the population, resulting in evacuation of the immediate area.	2	4	Health & Safety at Work etc Act 1974 Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations 2002 Management of Health & Safety at Work Regulations 1999 Reporting of Injuries Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations	Sept 2021 Sept 2022
R77 HIGH	Systems Failure LFB	Gas Supply Infrastructure A technical failure or accident in an upstream oil/gas facility, gas import pipeline terminal, or Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) import reception facility leading to disruption in UK gas supplies.	2	4	National Emergency Plan for Fuel	Nov 2020 Sept 2022

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Risk ID Rating	Sub-category Lead	Outcome Description	Likelihood	Impact	Controls in Place	Last Review Next Review
R63 HIGH	HAZMAT UKHSA	Accidental Release of a Biological Substance Inadvertent release of a biological agent caused by an unrelated work activity (e.g. Legionella release due to improperly maintained building environmental control systems) that causes up to 7 fatalities and up to 500 people requiring hospital admissions.	4	3	Health & Safety at Work Act etc 1974 Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations 2002 The Notification of Cooling Towers and Evaporative Condenser Regulations 1992 require the notification of wet cooling towers and evaporative condensers to local authorities Management of Health & Safety at Work Regulations 1999 Reporting of Injuries Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations	Nov 2020 Sept 2022
R105 MEDIUM	Accident Local Authorities	Complex built environments Consequences of a major incident affecting large buildings or a complex built environment. Incidents in these facilities/areas have the potential to trigger a complex chain of events that lead to serious consequences for public safety.	2	3	Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. Management of Health & Safety at Work Regulations 1999. Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 & guidance pursuant to the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005. Safety at Sports Grounds Act 1975 and Fire Safety and Safety of Places of Sport Act 1987 Local building safety systems and practices Safety Advisory Groups in place at major sports grounds	Nov 2020 Sept 2022
R61 MEDIUM	Fires & Industrial Accidents LFB	Fire or explosion at an onshore fuel pipeline Accidental fire or explosion occurs at an onshore fuel pipeline close to a populated area affecting an area around the explosion of up to 1km.	1	3	Control of Major Accident Hazard 1999 (COMAH) Regulations. The Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmosphere Regulations 2002 Petroleum Regulations Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 Site Operators on-site contingency plans Emergency Services specialist resources	Sept 2021 Sept 2023

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Risk ID Rating	Sub-category Lead	Outcome Description	Likelihood	Impact	Controls in Place	Last Review Next Review
R64 MEDIUM	HAZMAT LFB	Large Toxic Chemical Release Large toxic chemical release caused by release of chlorine or other chemicals. This incident arises from possible mechanical equipment/process failure or corrosion, and not necessarily involving fire or explosion.	1	3	Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 2005 (COMAH) Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 Emergency Services and other responder specialist resources	Sept 2021 Sept 2023
L66 MEDIUM	HAZMAT LFB	Radioactive incident caused by mishandling of radioactive material A radioactive substance released in London because of an accident at a site or during transportation of radioactive material.	1	3	Radiation Monitoring Equipment deployed in affected areas. London Fire Brigade Mass Decontamination Procedures Scientific Technical Advice Cell (STAC) Scientific Advice to Government in Emergencies (SAGE) Radiation Protection Advisors	Sept 2021 Sept 2022
R69 MEDIUM	HAZMAT Local Authorities (W)	Food Supply Contamination A major contamination incident involving a microbiological pathogen in the food chain. This would cause illness, hospitalisation and possible fatalities over a period of time while the source if contaminate is identified, and an overall response time of months.	2	3	Food Safety Act 1990 Imports monitored Local Authority Environmental Health Sampling Public Health England monitoring and surveillance Food Standards Agency plans	Nov 2020 Sept 2022
R55 MEDIUM	Accident LFB	Fire or explosion at a fuel distribution site Fire or explosion at a fuel distribution site, or at a site storing flammable and/or toxic liquids.	1	4	Control of Major Accident Hazard 1999 (COMAH) Regulations. The Dangerous Substances and Explosive Atmosphere Regulations 2002 Petroleum Regulations Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 Site Operators on-site contingency plans Emergency Services specialist resources	Sept 2021 Sept 2023

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Risk ID Rating	Sub-category Lead	Outcome Description	Likelihood	Impact	Controls in Place	Last Review Next Review
R57 MEDIUM	Accident LFB	Explosion at a high-pressure gas pipeline Fire or explosion at a gas pipeline following ignition of gas under high pressure. This could result in a crater, destruction of buildings and evacuation of homes, as well as a cloud of gas/vapour.	1	4	Pipeline Safety Regulations 1996 Regulatory and industry measures including provision of maps for excavation Emergency Services and other responder specialist resources	Sept 2021 Sept 2023
R71 MEDIUM	Accident LFB	Aviation crash The worst-case scenario involves the collision of two commercial aircrafts.	1	4	Stringent controls on aircraft entering UK Airspace including the mandatory use of Aircraft Collision Avoidance systems on heavy aircraft. Access to UK airspace is heavily regulated CAA Maintenance and Flight safety standards exceed ICAO recommendations Airline maintenance regimes subject to CAA scrutiny and regulation. Strict controls over London Approach.	Sept 2021 Sept 2023
L71a MEDIUM	Accident LFB	Large aircraft incident in proximity to airport Aircraft incident in close proximity of the airport boundary with fatalities or serious injuries resulting. Possibility for local structural collapse, HazMat material contamination.	2	3	See R71	Sept 2021 Sept 2022
L71b MEDIUM	Accident LFB	Small aircraft incident in proximity to airport Small aircraft incident variation of L71a. Under 20 people directly involved in incident.	3	2	See R71	Sept 2021 Sept 2022

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Risk ID Rating	Sub-category Lead	Outcome Description	Likelihood	Impact	Controls in Place	Last Review Next Review
L64 MEDIUM	Accident LFB	Localised industrial accident involving small toxic release Localised industrial accident involving small toxic release impacting up to 1km from site causing up to 10 fatalities and up to 100 casualties.	2	3	Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 2005 (COMAH) Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005	Sept 2021 Sept 2023
HL10 MEDIUM	Accident TfL	Local accident on motorways and major trunk roads Multiple vehicle incident causing up to 10 fatalities and up to 20 casualties (internal injuries, fractures, possible burns); closure of lanes or carriageway causing major disruption and delay.	2	2	The Road Traffic Act 1988 The Road Vehicle (Construction and Use) Regulations 1986 The Traffic Management Act 2004	Sept 2021 Sept 2023
HL11 MEDIUM	Accident TfL	Railway Accident Up to 30 fatalities and up to 100 casualties, (fractures, internal injuries - burns less likely). Possible loss of freight. Major disruption to rail line including possible closure of rail tunnel.	3	2	Railway and Transport Safety Act 2003 Railways (Access and Management) Regulations 2005 Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005 Railways (Licensing of Railway Undertakings) Regulations 2005 Railways Act 2005 The Health and Safety (Enforcing Authority for Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems) Regulations 2006 The Railway Safety Levy Regulations 2006 The Railways Act 1993 Transport Act 2000 Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 The Railway (Safety Case) Regulations 2000	Sept 2021 Sept 2023

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Risk ID Rating	Sub-category Lead	Outcome Description	Likelihood	Impact	Controls in Place	Last Review Next Review
HL22 MEDIUM	Accident Local Authorities	Building Collapse Collapse of a large building (high-rise block, shopping mall etc). Up to 100 fatalities depending on the size and construction of building, and occupation rates, and 350 casualties. Potential for trapped or missing people. Localised loss of power and other essential services. Local access routes affected due to road closures.	1	3	Building Control regulations enforced by Local Authorities Construction, renovation, maintenance and demolition standards and enforcement Emergency Services and other responders specialist resources	Nov 2020 Sept 2022
Page 16 HL23 MEDIUM	Accident Local Authorities	Bridge Collapse Roads, access routes and transport infrastructure impassable for considerable length of time. Severe congestion over wide geographical area. Emergency access into/out of large populated areas severely restricted. Potential for trapped or missing people.	1	3	Building Control regulations enforced by Local Authorities Regular inspections under the Highways Act 1980 Height and weight restrictions and signs reduce the likelihood of an incident	Nov 2020 Sept 2022
HL34 MEDIUM	Accident MCA	Evacuation of passenger ship Incident involving a passenger vessel in or close to UK waters leading to the ship's evacuation (or partial evacuation). A major incident involving a passenger vessel operating on the tidal Thames within the London Resilience area may result in a major loss of life by drowning.	1	3	Port of London Act 1968 (as amended) General Directions for Navigating in the Port of London Port of London Thames Byelaws 2012 International and national regulation of shipping aimed at preventing accidents by the safe construction and operation of ships by competent crews and shipping operators. These regulations are enforced by Flag States and subject to rigorous Port State Control checks, co-ordinated in European waters MCA (Class V legislation and High-Speed Craft Code) Port Marine Safety Code Port of London Authority Emergency Plans	Nov 2020 Sept 2022

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Risk ID Rating	Sub-category Lead	Outcome Description	Likelihood	Impact	Controls in Place	Last Review Next Review
R75 MEDIUM	Systems Failure Thames Water	Water Supply Infrastructure Failure of water infrastructure or loss of drinking water caused by the complete and relatively sudden loss of piped water supply or the degradation of the piped supply such that it is unfit for human consumption even after boiling. The RWCS assumes up to 350,000 people affected for between 24 hours and two weeks.	1	3	Water Industry Act 1991 Security and Emergency Measures Direction 1998 Water companies mutual aid arrangements in place	Nov 2020 Sept 2022
R78 MEDIUM	Systems Failure LFB	Disruption to or failure of telecommunications systems Loss of fixed and mobile telecommunications (both voice service and internet access) for up to 100,000 people for up to 72 hours.	2	2	Civil Contingencies Act 2004 Telephone provider demand and network capacity management strategies National Emergency Alert for Telecoms	Nov 2020 Sept 2022
R79 MEDIUM	Systems Failure	Technology Failure at a retail Bank A technological failure which renders a significant portion of a retail bank's IT inoperable. Immediate effects last for 48-72 hours, with some customers experiencing disruption for several weeks as backlogs are cleared and potentially also some permanent data loss or data corruption.	4	2	Financial services sector plans to deal with a surge in demand for consumer facing financial services Communication plans to encourage consumer awareness which can be coordinated between HM Treasury, the Bank of England, and the Financial Conduct Authority Collective incident response capability under the Authorities Response Framework Business Continuity Management plans for financial service sector firms and their regulators.	Sept 2020 Sept 2022

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Risk ID Rating	Sub-category Lead	Outcome Description	Likelihood	Impact	Controls in Place	Last Review Next Review
R74 MEDIUM	Systems Failure EA	Reservoir/Dam Collapse A reservoir or dam collapses without warning resulting in almost instantaneous flooding. Significant movement of debris (including vehicles) and sediment. Complete destruction of some residential and commercial properties and serious damage of up to 500 properties. Several thousand other properties could be flooded.	1	4	Reservoirs Act, 1975 Water Act, 2003 Regular statutory inspections Met Office National Severe Weather Warning Service	Nov 2020 Sept 2022
R66 MEDIUM	Accident LFB	Radiation Release from overseas nuclear accident A radioactive substance release that affects the UK because of a nuclear accident overseas e.g. at a waste storage facility. UK outcome could include initial food restrictions, potential transport disruptions and impacts to the health system including the presentation of worried well.	1	4	REPPIR	Nov 2020 Sept 2022

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Risk ID Rating	Sub-category Lead	Outcome Description	Likelihood	Impact	Controls in Place	Last Review Next Review
R62 LOW	HAZMAT UKHSA	Accidental release of a Biological Pathogen Biological substance release from a facility where pathogens are handled deliberately (e.g. Hazard Group 3 or 4 pathogen release from containment laboratory). A pathogen is accidentally released from a containment laboratory in an urban area that causes up to 5 fatalities, up to 500 hospital admissions, and a further 1500 nonhospital cases.	1	2	Animal Health Act 1981 Specified Animal Pathogens Order 1998 Health & Safety at Work etc Act 1974 Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations 2000 Management of Health & Safety at Work Regulations 1999 Reporting of Injuries Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations Carriage of Dangerous Goods (Classification, Packaging and Labelling Regulations H12 Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained Use) Regulations 2000 Regulation, audit and enforcement of legislation by HSE	Nov 2020 Sept 2022
R67 LOW	HAZMAT PLA	Maritime Pollution A large fully laden oil super tanker sinks in the approach to a port leading to the spillage of 100,000 tonnes of crude oil into the sea polluting up to 200km of coastline. The scenario assumes no loss of access to Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminals or other major port infrastructure.	1	2	Dangerous Substances in Harbour Areas Regulations 1987. Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation Convention) Regulations 1998. Port State Control checks coordinated in European waters All vessels navigating on the tidal Thames required PLA licence PLA Vessel Traffic Service National Contingency Plan for Marine Pollution from Shipping and Offshore Installations (2000) Oil Spill Contingency Plan Guidelines for Ports, Harbours & Oil Handling Facilities	2019 2022

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Risk ID Rating	Sub-category Lead	Outcome Description	Likelihood	Impact	Controls in Place	Last Review Next Review
R70 LOW	HAZMAT LFB	Radiation exposure from stolen goods Incorrect handling of a stolen radioactive source leads to accidental exposure to radioactive material. Three deaths after a month and eight people requiring long term medical supervision. Up to 500 'worried well'.	1	1	Radioactive Substances Act 1993 High Activity Sealed Source Regulations 2005 Arrangements for safe handling and disposal of radioactive sources Radiation detectors at high risk sites Environment Agency inspections of all major sources Emergency Services specialist resources	Nov 2020 Sept 2022

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4.2 Human and Animal Diseases

Risk ID Rating	Lead	Outcome Description	Likelihood	Impact	Controls in Place	Last Review Next Review
R95 VERY HIGH	UKHSA	Influenza-type pandemic A worldwide outbreak of influenza occurs when a novel flu virus emerges with sustained human to human transmission. Up to 50% of the population may experience symptoms, which could lead to up to 750,000 fatalities in total in the UK. Absenteeism would be significant and could reach 20% for 2-3 weeks at the height of the pandemic, either because people are personally ill or caring for someone who is ill, causing significant impact on business continuity.	3	5	NHS Vaccination Programme (Seasonal and provision for pandemic specific) Specific NHS capacity and response planning Comprehensive surveillance systems	Sept 2021 Sept 2022
Page 81 R96 HIGH	UKHSA	The growth and spread of anti-microbial resistance The emergence of a pan-resistance, highly virulent bacterial strain causing a number of different pan-resistant bacterial infections to develop that can spread between people. Existing control measures would be overwhelmed, and transmissions would be sustained between health care settings and communities.	3	3	Health & Safety at Work etc Act 1974 Management of Health & Safety at Work Regulations 1999 Health Sector response plans. Regulation and audit by HSE Guidance produced by UKHSA for acute trusts to control spread of CPE The Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens (ACDP) Carriage of Dangerous Goods (Classification, Packaging and Labelling Regulations Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained Use) Regulations 2014	Sept 2021 Sept 2022

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Risk ID Rating	Lead	Outcome Description	Likelihood	Impact	Controls in Place	Last Review Next Review
R97 HIGH	UKHSA	Emerging infectious diseases Based upon the experience of the outbreak of SARS and more recently, MERS and Ebola, the worst case likely impact of such an outbreak originating outside the UK would be cases occurring amongst returning travellers and their families and close contacts, with spread to health care workers within a hospital setting. However, it is unlikely to present a wider threat to the UK through sustained spread.	3	3	NHS Vaccination Programme Specialist capability and capacity planning in NHS trusts Comprehensive surveillance systems and response arrangements	Sept 2021 Sept 2022
R104 HIGH	Humanitarian an MPS	Public Disorder Large scale public disorder at site(s) in a single city, or in multiple cities, occurring concurrently over several days.	5	3	Specific riot and public order legislation Riot Compensation Act 2016 Public Order Act 1986 Police community tension monitoring processes Police community engagement teams Advice and guidance from police regarding legitimate protest from event planners	Sept 2021 Sept 2022
R98 MEDIUM	Local Authorities (SE)	Outbreak of animal disease Disease introduced into a predominantly sheep area and infected animals sold at market or moved to other premises before disease is detected resulting in widely dispersed multiple outbreaks. Assessment based on the need to cull and dispose up to 4 million animals with up to 900 infected premises across UK. Movement of all susceptible livestock prohibited unless licensed. Economic and reputational losses to the agriculture and food chain industry. Loss of disease-free status resulting in EU and third country import bans on livestock and livestock products from susceptible animals.	2	2	Animal Health Act 1981 Animal Health Act 2002 Other secondary legislation and EU directives National disease control strategies	Nov 2020 Sept 2022

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4.3 Societal Risks

Risk ID Rating	Sub-category Lead	Outcome Description	Likelihood	Impact	Controls in place	Last Review Next review
R105 MEDIUM	Humanitarian Local Authorities	Influx of British Nationals Influx of destitute/vulnerable British Nationals who are not normally resident in the UK and cannot be accommodated by family/friends. Up to 10,000 BNs not normally resident in the UK returning to the UK within roughly a month following conventional war, widespread civil unrest, or sustained terrorism campaign against British and other Western nationals. Around 2% of returnees require statutory support including housing, health services and access to welfare.	4	2	Local authority: Standard social care and emergency housing arrangements. Existing mutual aid agreements in place across London. Heathrow Travel Care – a team of social workers. Other organisations: Full time officer located at Heathrow (alongside Heathrow TravelCare) to consider the issue of repatriation at ports. Position funded by the Foreign & Commonwealth Office. Red Cross and FCO agreement on repatriation; Meet & greet returning passengers at airport, arrange onward transport, supported by the FCO	Nov 2020 Sept 2022
R102 MEDIUM	Industrial Action Local Authorities	Industrial action (fuel supply) Actual or threatened significant disruption to the distribution of fuel by road due to any cause, including industrial action by fuel tanker drivers. Retail filling stations, depending on the extent of the disruption and their locations and assuming no panic-buying, would likely run out of fuel within 4-5 days.	2	2	Legal requirements re: conduct of industrial disputes. Stocks of contingency fuel to varying degrees National Emergency Plan for Fuel	Sept 2021 Sept 2023

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Risk ID Rating	Sub-category Lead	Outcome Description	Likelihood	Impact	Controls in place	Last Review Next review
R101 MEDIUM	Industrial Action TfL	Industrial action (public transport) Strike action by key rail or London Underground staff (e.g. signallers) resulting in the total shutdown of very significant amounts of the national rail network or about ¾ of the London Underground network. In both cases severe disruption could last for a week as part of a three-month campaign.	3	2	Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. Employment Act 1980. Employment Act 1988. Public Order Act 1986. Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003. Organisational Business Continuity Arrangements	Sept 2021 Sept 2023
R99 MEDIUM	Industrial Action LFB	Industrial action (firefighters) A national fire strike in England for a continuous eight-day period with loss of life directly attributable to a weakened response by individual fire and rescue services, and reputational impact on government.	2	2	Police Act (1996) RCN Code on Industrial Action Alternative emergency cover protocols for the Fire Brigade Organisational Business Continuity Arrangements Recall to active duty	Sept 2021 Sept 2023
R100 MEDIUM	Industrial Action MoJ	Industrial action (Prison officers) Industrial action by operational prison staff, leading to a shortfall of staff available for duty for more than 24 hours.	4	2	Criminal Justice and Public Order Act (1994)	Sept 2019 Sept 2022
R80 MEDIUM	Failure of governance Business Sector Panel	Systemic Financial Crisis A severe economic downturn and/or crisis of confidence precipitates the failure of one or more UK banks. This would have a major negative impact on the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) by reducing bank lending, consumption and broader investment. Such a crisis would likely lead to a recession and accompanying pressure on living standards.	2	3	PRA, FCA and FPC regulatory bodies Financial Services and markets Act 2000	Nov 2020 Sept 2022

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Risk ID Rating	Sub-category Lead	Outcome Description	Likelihood	Impact	Controls in place	Last Review Next review
R72 MEDIUM	Failure of Governance Local Authorities	Collapse of a major government contractor The collapse of a major provider of integrated facilities and construction services for a range of private and public organisations.	4	2	Commercial business continuity and contingency plans Service continuity plans to maintain critical services	Sept 2021 Sept 2023
R73 MEDIUM	Failure of governance Local Authorities	Major Social Care Provider Failure The failure of a major domiciliary care provider affecting 20,000 vulnerable people and their families.	4	2	Contingency planning for a large-scale incident of this type would remain with central government Local authority service continuity plans	Sept 2021 Sept 2023
R74 MEDIUM	Failure of governance Local Authorities	Insolvency affecting fuel supply Significant disruption to fuel supplies because of insolvency at a key refinery or terminals. Primary impacts are disruption to the production and/or supply of refined fuel products. Shortages can cause elevated short-term demand.	1	2	Reserve fleet of Road tankers Temporary financial assistance to some orgs to maintain fuel supplies while market responds. Central government arrangements for emergency fuel deliveries from downstream oil industry to maintain deliveries to key sites.	Sept 2021 Sept 2023

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4.4 Natural Hazards

Risk ID Rating	Lead	Outcome Description	Likelihood	Impact	Controls in Place	Last Review Next Review
R83 VERY HIGH Page 86	EA	Surface Water Flooding Surface water flooding in a large metropolitan area caused by a warm unstable atmosphere, most likely to occur in summer due to the warmer atmosphere having a greater water holding capacity, causes a pattern of convective rainfall events.	3	4	Flood and Water Management Act 2010 The Flood Risk Regulations 2009 Land Drainage Act 1991 Water Resources Act 1991 FFC – Flood Guidance Statements New building developments controlled through planning guidelines Multi Agency Flood Plans London Strategic Flood Framework National Flood Emergency Plan Environment Agency Floodline	Sept 2021 Sept 2022
L21 VERY HIGH	EA	Fluvial Flooding Successive bands of frontal rainfall saturate river catchments (soil moisture deficit is at zero) and fill river channels to full capacity. High intensity heavy rainfall causes fluvial rivers in London (tributaries to the Thames) to exceed channel capacity. Flooding happens very quickly with little warning and time for evacuations.	3	4	See R83	Sept 2021 Sept 2022

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Risk ID Rating	Lead	Outcome Description	Likelihood	Impact	Controls in Place	Last Review Next Review
R92 VERY HIGH	Met Office	Severe Space Weather Disruption to the electricity grid, resulting in two rural/coastal sub-station disconnections each effecting communities of approx. 100,000 people, with loss of power for 1 month or more and rota-disconnections for a further 1 month or more. Voltage instability may also result in local blackouts, most likely in urban areas lasting a few hours.	3	4	Electricity Industry monitoring and analysis of GIC Space Weather is assessed as part of the Daily Hazards Assessment National Grid design standards and response arrangements Alternative positioning, navigation and timing signal systems Forecasting through Met Office Space Weather Operations Centre	Nov 2020 Sept 2022
R84 VERY HIGH	EA	Severe Drought Following three consecutive and unprecedented dry winters London is in a severe drought (level 4) situation. Emergency drought orders are in place with millions of properties with severe water supply restrictions and low water pressure (impacting supply to properties at high levels and tower blocks). Increase of illnesses due to reduced use of water impacting on hygiene levels, increased casualties and potentially fatalities. Mental wellbeing impacts communities and public outrage leads to some disorder issues.	2	5	Water Resources Act 1991 DEFRA: Planning for Major Water and Wastewater Incidents in England and Wales Drought Plan direction document	Sept 2021 Sept 2022
R87 HIGH	Department for Transport	Volcanic eruption Volcanic ash incursions for up to 25 days (assumed not to be sulphur-rich) resulting in sporadic and temporary closures of significant parts of UK airspace for up to a total of 15 days (possibly non-consecutive) during a three-month eruption period	4	3	Met Office Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre Forecasting CAA Volcanic Ash Safety Regime Airline response plans	Sept 2019 Sept 2022

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Risk ID Rating	Lead	Outcome Description	Likelihood	Impact	Controls in Place	Last Review Next Review
R85 HIGH Page 88	EA	Poor Air Quality A 30-day period of elevated levels of either ozone or PM2.5 causing increases in death rates among vulnerable populations due to poor air exacerbating respiratory and cardio-vascular conditions.	3	3	Air Quality Standards Regulations 2010 European directive on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe (2008/50/EC) The UK Air Quality Strategy Environmental Permitting Regulations 2010 Clean Air Act & Environmental Protection Act Local authority air quality management areas and action plans- London Mayor's Air Quality Strategy which encompasses Ultra Low Emissions Zones and Low Emission Neighbourhoods AirTEXT warning system Local Air Quality Action Plans Local Air Quality Monitoring Network GLA Air Quality Action Plan	Nov 2020 Sept 2022
R90 HIGH	NHS	Heatwave Daily maximum temperatures greater than 32C and minimum temperatures greater than 15C over most of a region for around 2 weeks including at least 5 consecutive days. Up to 1,000 fatalities and 5,000 casualties, mainly amongst the elderly. There could be disruption to power supply, telecommunications and transport infrastructure within the 2 weeks.	4	3	Health & Safety at Work Act 1974 Public Health Act Heatwave Plan for England Long term planning for local authorities, CCGs and NHS Climate Change Adaption Strategy for London Heat Health Watch Department of Health Heatwave Plan for England	Dec 2020 Sept 2022

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Risk ID Rating	Lead	Outcome Description	Likelihood	Impact	Controls in Place	Last Review Next Review
R91 HIGH	Met Office	Low temperatures and heavy snow Low temperatures and snow (falling and lying) over substantial areas of low-lying land, (below 300m) for at least one week. After an initial fall of snow, there is further snowfall on and off for at least 7 days. Most lowland areas experience some snow fall greater than 10cm at a time, with overall snow depth greater than 30cm. This would coincide with a period of at least 7 consecutive days with a daily mean temperature below -3C.	3	3	Met Office Hazard Manager service Warning & Informing Category 1 & 2 responders' emergency response, BCM and severe weather plans. Highways Agency, TfL and local authorities' winter road maintenance plans. Met Office forecasts & National Severe Weather Warning Service TfL snow desk Op GRIDLOCK to support motorists stranded on M25.	Nov 2020 Sept 2022
L19 HIGH	EA	Groundwater Flooding Following unprecedented amounts of extended above average rainfall throughout 3 winter months groundwater levels are exceptionally high throughout London. The main areas of concern are in the South East of London where the geology is predominately chalk.	3	3	Flood and Water Management Act 2010 The Flood Risk Regulations 2009 Land Drainage Act 1991 Water Resources Act 1991 Environment Agency Floodline FFC – Flood Guidance Statements New building developments controlled through planning guidelines Multi Agency Flood Plans London Strategic Flood Framework National flood emergency plan	Sept 2021 Sept 2022

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Risk ID Rating	Lead	Outcome Description	Likelihood	Impact	Controls in Place	Last Review Next Review
HL19 HIGH	EA	Coastal/Tidal Flooding Localised tidal flooding resulting from sudden breach of a section of the Thames tidal wall or embankment caused by a vehicle collision or construction incident or a failure of a tidal flood gate coinciding with high tides on the river Thames.	3	3	See L19	Sept 2021 Sept 2022
R03 +03 06 00 MEDIUM	Met Office	Storms and Gales Storm force winds affect multiple regions for at least 6 hours during a working day. Most inland and lowland areas experience mean speeds greater than 55mph and gusts faster than 85mph.	3	2	Met Office Hazard Manager service Warning & Informing Category 1 & 2 responders emergency response plans Highways Agency response plans. TfL adverse weather plans LFB USAR and Water Rescue capabilities. LAS HART	Nov 2020 Sept 2022
HL21 MEDIUM	LFB	Land Movement Roads and access routes impassable for a time. Emergency access into/out of large populated areas difficult or impossible; severe congestion over wide geographical area. Loss of power and other essential services over wide geographical area. Potential for trapped or missing people either in landslides itself and/or in collapsed structures.	3	2	Land use planning restrictions Building Control regulations enforced by Local Authorities. Construction, renovation, maintenance and demolition standards	Nov 2020 Sept 2022

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Risk ID Rating	Lead	Outcome Description	Likelihood	Impact	Controls in Place	Last Review Next Review
L54c MEDIUM	Accident LFB	Fires involving landfill and waste processing sites Major fire lasting several days with significant environmental and local impacts.	5	3	See R54	Sept 2021 Sept 2022
L54d MEDIUM	Accident LFB	Wildfires in proximity to large urban areas A major wildfire spreading over an area of over 100 hectares at the urban-rural interface. Significant environmental impacts and risks to residential property and essential services.	3	2	See R54 London Fire Brigade borough specific rural strategies Specialist firefighting equipment and resources	Sept 2021 Sept 2022
L54e MEDIUM	Accident LFB	Major fire in care homes and hospitals Fire causing up to 20 fatalities of vulnerable people in residence causing the closure of an entire hospital or care home.	3	2	See R54	Sept 2021 Sept 2022
R94 LOW	Local Authorities	Earthquake An earthquake that results in the ground shaking with an intensity of six on the European Macroseismic Scale (EMS), this is classed as 'strong'. Many houses and buildings suffer slight non-structural damage like hair-line cracks and falling of small pieces of plaster.	1	1	London and national generic response plans <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Site clearance • Evacuation & Shelter • Recovery Mutual aid arrangements Specialist fire and rescue assets	Sept 2021 Sept 2023

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4.5 Hostile State Activity

Risk ID Rating	Lead	Outcome Description	Likelihood	Impact	Controls in Place	Last Review Next Review
R43 LOW	Local Authorities	Undermining Democratic Activity A cyber-attack conducted by a hostile state actor on a UK Electoral system during an election period. The attack could cause disruption to the electoral processes, resulting in data loss or manipulation and impact the result, or public confidence in the result.	3	1	UK Electoral processes largely not reliant on computer systems vulnerable to this type of attack	Nov 2020 Sept 2022

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4.6 Threats

In this public version of the risk register, threats and cyber risks are grouped and summarised by target. Further detail on the types of threats is available in the [National Risk Register](#).

Threats are assessed nationally so reassessment dates are not included.

Risk ID Rating	Outcome Description	Likelihood	Impact	Controls in Place
<div>Page 33</div> <div>23</div> <div>MEDIUM</div>	<p>Attacks on Publically Accessible Locations</p> <p>There has been an increase in the frequency of terrorist attacks in the UK from 2017. Nearly all attacks have occurred in publically accessible locations.</p> <p>A defining feature of such attacks is the targeting of people. This may be random or aimed at a specific group. Impacts may include fatalities and physical and/or psychological casualties, significant damage to infrastructure and other property, increased demands on and disruption to essential services.</p>	5	2	<p>Continued warning and informing of crowded places through heightened security alerts and Physical security measures where appropriate</p> <p>Emergency services response plans & specialist resources</p> <p>Work of Counter Terrorism Security Advisors to raise awareness and provide training</p> <p>Op Servator hostile reconnaissance disruption operations</p> <p>Targeted comms from counter terrorism police to stakeholders</p> <p>Public awareness campaigns providing advice to the public including digital tools and e-learning</p>

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Risk ID Rating	Outcome Description	Likelihood	Impact	Controls in Place
T2 HIGH Page 94	Attacks on Infrastructure Critical National Infrastructure are the facilities, systems, sites, information, people, networks and processes that keep the UK running and provide the essential services we all rely on. This includes electricity and water services and telecommunications. Attacks could be carried out with a variety of methods, including explosives or cyber attacks. Consequences of attacks of this nature could include disruption to essential services, possible evacuation of residents or employees, economic impacts.	4	3	UK Government's counter-terrorism Strategy (CONTEST) (summarised above) Business continuity plans for loss of essential services helps to minimise disruption to users. Well established programme of work to protect infrastructure from terrorism including protective security advice from Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure and local Police services National Cyber Security Centre advises government and industry on how to secure cyber infrastructure and to respond to incidents. Consequence based planning by the authorities ensuring that responses to a variety of emergencies are already planned for.
	Attacks on Transport In the UK, conventional terrorist attacks on land and air-based transport are more likely than against maritime transport. Physical attacks could take a variety of forms including explosives, noxious substances or attackers wielding blades. Consequences of an attack on a transport system could include fatalities and physical and/or psychological casualties, disruption to the transport system and negative impacts to the national economy.			Regulation and monitoring of services by DfT requiring certain organisations to deliver a range of security measures. DfT also provides advice and best practise to other sectors. "See it. Say it. Sorted." campaign. BTP work with industry and DfT on security and provide tailored policing of the railway network. Contingency plans developed by operators in conjunction with responders Op Servator hostile reconnaissance disruption operations run by PSO & BTP

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Risk ID Rating	Outcome Description	Likelihood	Impact	Controls in Place
T4 MEDIUM Page 95	Cyber attacks <p>Cyber criminals engage in criminal activity to exploit weaknesses in online systems, usually for financial gain. As well as using technology to commit a crime (such as hacking to steal data), offenders can also increase the scale and reach of a crime (such as cyber-enabled non-fiscal fraud). States and state-sponsored threats tend to be politically motivated, and may attempt to access and cause disruption to strategic systems across government and other key sectors.</p>	4	2	<p>National Cyber Security Strategy sets out the government response to ensuring that government, CNI, business and citizens are as resilient as possible to cyber threats.</p> <p>The National Cyber Security Centre, part of GCHQ, supports the most critical organisations in the UK to improve their cyber resilience. The NCSC also responds to cyber incidents to minimise harm to the UK, help with recovery and learn lessons for the future.</p> <p>Additional outreach to businesses and public regarding cyber threats and security</p> <p>Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure providing security and cyber security advice</p>

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Risk ID Rating	Outcome Description	Likelihood	Impact	Controls in Place
T5 MEDIUM Page 96	<p>Smaller Scale CBRN Attacks</p> <p>Malicious actors remain interested in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) attack methods. In the UK, it is assessed that terrorists are more likely to use knives, vehicles or improvised explosive devices, but the threats of CBRN attacks cannot be ruled out.</p> <p>CBRN attacks have the potential to kill, injure and cause wide-ranging harm. Depending on the method used there is potential for catastrophic blast damage, widespread infection, or contamination of people, the environment, buildings, water supplies and food.</p> <p>Attacks could range from a small target incident, to large catastrophic events at the highest end of the spectrum, such as the widespread dispersal of a biological agent or the detonation of an improvised nuclear device.</p>	4	2	<p>Improving methods to detect and monitor CBRN materials, including through the border.</p> <p>Regulating access to hazardous materials and their precursors</p> <p>Improving and maintaining capabilities to enable emergency responders to respond effectively, rapidly and safely</p> <p>Provision of guidance in incidents and increasing public access to information on what to do during general and hazardous materials emergencies</p> <p>Local and organisational CBRN response plans</p> <p>Well-developed specialist response capabilities</p> <p>Access to medical countermeasures and adaptability of other consequence-based plans to respond to unconventional attacks</p> <p>Decontamination process of people and place regularly trained and tested.</p> <p>Continuity plans to ensure effective civil government can continue throughout and after an incident.</p>
T6 HIGH	<p>Medium Scale CBRN Attacks</p> <p>See T5 outcome description</p>	4	3	See T5 Controls in Place

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Risk ID Rating	Outcome Description	Likelihood	Impact	Controls in Place
T7 VERY HIGH	<p>Larger Scale CBRN Attacks</p> <p>See T5 outcome description</p> <p>A larger-scale CBRN attack has never happened in the UK, but would be more challenging to respond to than other malicious attacks, due to the potential health impacts and widespread environmental contamination. CBRN events can also present responders and those affected with significant levels of uncertainty about what has happened, and the scientific evidence may evolve as the incident unfolds. This leads to widespread psychological impacts including anxiety.</p>	3	5	See T5 Controls in place

Appendix 1 - The 6 Stage Risk Assessment Process

Contextualisation

A range of factors influence the assessment of both likelihood and impact of risks. Demographics, transportation and environmental factors all exert an influence on how a risk would manifest in a particular area. The Borough Resilience Forums in Havering use this local context to develop our own risk assessments.

Hazard Identification and allocation for assessment

London Risk Advisory Group identifies the threats and hazards that, in their view, could give rise to an emergency within London in the next 2 years.

Lead risk assessors agreed by the group then undertake to assess the likelihood of each risk occurring, and to make a judgement of how impactful the RWCS of that risk would be. Risks included in the risk register are subject to a scheduled review programme to ensure that each risk is revisited and updated periodically by LRAG and subsequently by the Havering RAWG.

Risk analysis

Drawing on guidance from Government, other research and local knowledge, lead assessors consider the likelihood of the risk over the next five-year period. Individual Risk Assessments are then provided to the London Risk Advisory Group for discussion and approval. This information is then passed on to Borough to adopt at a community level.

Risk evaluation

Individual Risk Assessments are confirmed and summary information collated into the London Risk Register, which has been used to create the Havering Borough Risk Register.

Risk treatment

Gaps in capability against the reasonable worst-case scenarios is assessed periodically by the London Resilience Forum, where additional risk management options are agreed as necessary.

Monitoring and Review

Risk assessment is not a static process and is subject to constant review. At a minimum, each Individual Risk Assessment is formally reviewed on a 2-year cycle. An annual update of the London Risk Register is published in the spring. This will be used to update the Borough Risk Register.

Appendix 2 – Likelihood and Impact Scoring Scales

Further detail on the scoring measures is provided in Annex 4D of “Emergency Preparedness” (HM Government, 2005) or Local Risk Management Guidance (available via Resilience Direct).

Likelihood scale

Score	Likelihood Descriptor	Probability of the Reasonable Worst-Case Scenario occurring within a 12-month period
1	Low	Less than 0.2% chance of occurring per year
2	Medium Low	Between 0.2% and 1%
3	Medium	Between 1% and 5%
4	Medium High	Between 5% and 25%
5	High	More than 25%

Impacts Categories

Each impact category is split into several “indicators” which are scored out of five. Indicator scores are amalgamated to reach a score for that category, and the category scores are amalgamated to reach an overall impact score.

Impact Category	Explanation
Human Welfare	Includes numbers of fatalities and casualties resulting from the RWCS, needs for mass evacuation, and short- and long-term accommodation.
Behavioural Impacts	Psychological impacts of the risk, including how people’s perception and behaviour might change because of the risk.
Economic	An approximate net economic cost, including both direct (e.g. loss of goods, buildings, infrastructure) and indirect (e.g. loss of business, increased demand for public services) costs.
Essential Services	How the RWCS might impact the emergency services, critical infrastructure, transport, education and other service and infrastructure providers
Environment	Encompassing long-term impact of contamination or pollution of land, water or air with harmful biological / chemical / radioactive matter or oil, flooding, or disruption or destruction of plant or animal life.
Security	Includes impacts to law enforcement and intelligence services, and disruptions to criminal justice and border security.

Appendix 3 – Overall Risk Rating Definitions

Definitions of Nationally Approved Risk Ratings

Very High (VH)	These are classed as primary or critical risks requiring immediate attention. They may have a high or medium likelihood of occurrence, but their potential consequences are such that they must be treated as a high priority. This may mean that strategies should be developed to reduce or eliminate the risks, but also that mitigation in the form of (multi-agency) planning, exercising and training for these hazards should be put in place and the risk monitored on a regular frequency. Consideration should be given to planning being specific to the risk rather than generic.
High (H)	These risks are classed as significant. They may have a high or low likelihood of occurrence, but their potential consequences are sufficiently serious to warrant appropriate consideration after those risks classed as 'very high'. Consideration should be given to the development of strategies to reduce or eliminate the risks, but also that mitigation in the form of at least (multi-agency) generic planning, exercising and training should be put in place and monitored on a regular frequency.
Medium (M)	These risks are less significant but may cause upset and inconvenience in the short term. These risks should be monitored to ensure that they are being appropriately managed, and consideration given to their being managed under generic emergency planning arrangements.
Low (L)	These risks are both unlikely to occur and not significant in their impact. They should be managed using normal or generic planning arrangements and require minimal monitoring and control unless subsequent risk assessments show a substantial change, prompting a move to another risk category.

Based on the model risk rating matrix published in Annex 4F of "Emergency Preparedness" (HM Government, 2005)

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